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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
William H. M eyers
The Farmer-Owned Reserve Program (FOR) was 
inaugurated in April of 1977 by Secretary of Agri­
culture Bergland under the authority of existing leg­
islation. Congress followed suit by specifically 
adopting FOR provisions for wheat and feed grains in 
the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977. Although the 
government had owned large stocks of grains and 
fibers in the 1950s and 1960s, the FOR was the first 
deliberate effort in the history of U.S. agriculture to 
establish a stabilization stocks program.
Since its inception, the FOR program has been at 
various times praised and damned by farmers, policy 
analysts, and policymakers. It has been seen at times 
as a force controlling fluctuations in commodity sup­
plies and price and at times as a force out of control. 
Regardless of whether it is viewed as a good or poor 
policy instrument, there is no question that the FOR 
program has had a substantial influence on com­
modity markets and policy. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show 
the rapid growth of the FOR and its variability in 
response to market and policy conditions. During the 
last 5 years, members of the North Central Regional 
Research Project NC-169 have been reviewing the 
evidence on the FOR and evaluating the performance 
of this new and rather innovative policy instrument. 
Although the program is new relative to many other 
commodity program provisions, it is an appropriate 
time for a thorough review of the evidence on its 
performance.
Several recent policy changes have substantially 
reduced the central role that the FOR previously 
played in commodity programs. The massive use of 
payment-in-kind out of FOR stocks beginning in the 
1983/84 crop year fundamentally altered the con­
ENDING STOCKS OF CORN
Figure 1.1. Ending Stocks of Corn, 1975-1984.
straints on marketing grain from the FOR. Moreover, 
the FOR was nearly eliminated during the 1985 de­
liberation on new legislation. The program was re­
tained, but the new legislation expanded the use of 
payment-in-kind. Thus, the functioning of the FOR 
as originally designed basically ended in 1983/84, 
although the program has continued in a different 
and less important role. This report summarizes the 
research findings of the NC-169 members as well as 
evaluations previously conducted by others. The 
analysis focuses primarily on the first 8 years of the 
program from crop years 1976/77 to 1983/84.
The Farmer-Owned Reserve Concept
The basic concept of the FOR is that farmers 
rather than government should own the reserve 
stocks. The idea of reserve stocks is at least as old as 
the Biblical story of Joseph and the 7 years of plenty 
followed by 7 years of drought in Egypt. Most reserve 
stocks schemes before the FOR, however, were based 
on government ownership. Farmer ownership adds to 
the difficulty of implementing a balanced stock pro­
gram. When supplies are plentiful and the price low, 
the FOR program provides incentives to encourage 
farmers to keep grain off the market by placing it in 
sealed storage. The program then prevents farmers 
from selling the grain until prices rise above specified 
(release) levels. Thus, the implementation of FOR 
requires the government not only to establish an 
appropriate price range for stabilization but also to 
determine what incentives and disincentives will in­
duce farmers to hold and release the appropriate 
quantities of grain at the appropriate time.
ENDING STOCKS OE WHEAT
Figure 1.2. Ending Stocks of Wheat, 1975-1984.
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The USDA used combinations of nonrecourse 
loans, storage subsidies, and interest rate waivers as 
incentives to encourage placement of grain in pro­
gram storage and removed these incentives to en­
courage sales. Chapter 7 provides a detailed descrip­
tion of the provisions and how they changed over 
time. One reason for the frequent changes in pro­
gram provisions was that, as in any new program, 
there was not much of a research base upon which to 
rely for setting provisions. Thus, there was quite a bit 
of experimentation with provisions as the program 
progressed. The research reported in this publication 
provides a basis for improved implementation, should 
the FOR be continued in the future.
Farmers’ Response to the FOR
One of the earliest research efforts on the FOR 
focused on understanding the farm level response to 
the new program and its incentives and penalties. 
This research, reported in Chapter 6, includes both 
an analysis of a typical farmer’s decision processes 
and an evaluation of farm survey data on participants 
and nonparticipants. The survey results indicate 
what type of farmers found it attractive to participate 
in the program and what influenced decisions on 
volume and timing of placements and redemptions of 
grain.
Aggregate Response to the FOR
The total effect of individual farmers’ decisions in 
response to the FOR provisions is seen in the market 
level response. If market prices change or program 
provisions change, there is a reaction by farmers that 
causes grain to move into or out of FOR storage. At
the same time, prices are influenced by what happens 
to FOR grain storage. As farmers seal more grain in 
the FOR, market supplies are reduced and price is 
increased. The reverse is true when stocks are re­
leased. These relationships are examined in Chapter 
2.
Another important relationship is the influence of 
reserve stocks on the level of private stocks. If an 
increase in FOR stocks of 100 bushels leads a farmer 
to reduce privately held stocks by an equal amount, 
the FOR can have no significant effect on prices and 
price stability. Numerous research efforts have been 
devoted to this question and are reviewed in Chapter 
3.
The interdependence between grain stabilization 
and the livestock sector is examined in Chapter 4. 
Stabilizing grain prices has definite implications for 
livestock producers, but the livestock sector can itself 
be a stabilizing factor in grain markets. An evalua­
tion of the FOR is not complete without consideration 
of its influence on the livestock sector.
Evaluation of the FOR
Numerous evaluations of the FOR have been con­
ducted over the past several years. The studies were 
done by a variety of researchers and used a variety of 
different time periods and techniques. The review in 
Chapter 5 is designed to seek the common ground 
among these studies. A single study is normally less 
persuasive than a combination of studies that reach 
similar conclusions. It is especially important that 
alternative methods and researchers be employed in 
an evaluation of a new program with a limited history 
upon which to rely.
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Part One—  
Aggregate Response 
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243

Chapter 2
Aggregate Response of Reserve Quantities 
to Price and Program Provisions
William H. M eyers, Duane Schouten, and 
D. Craig Smyth
Farmers’ decisions cause grain reserve quantities 
to fluctuate from month to month and year to year. 
These decisions are influenced by the Farmer-Owned 
Reserve (FOR) provisions announced by the govern­
ment, as well as by current market conditions and 
other factors (see Chapter 6). In general if market 
prices are below the release price, reserve quantities 
will increase as prices decline or the program provi­
sions become more attractive to farmers. If market 
prices are high enough to release grain from the 
reserve, redemptions increase as prices rise or as 
provisions make it more costly for farmers to hold the 
grain. These changes in reserve quantities simul­
taneously influence price levels. As placements in­
crease, price declines are slowed. As redemptions 
increase, price increases are muted.
Aggregate Placements and Redemptions
Monthly movements in grain reserve quantities 
and in market prices and reserve trigger levels over 
seven crop years are shown in figures 2.1,2.2,2.3, and 
2.4. Clearly the quantity changes are influenced by 
market prices. The data also show the effect of signifi­
cant changes in program provisions.
Corn
A comparison of figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrates the 
price and provision effects for com. Even before Oc­
tober 1979, when grain had to be in the regular loan 
program 9 months before placement in the reserve, 
placements accelerated as prices fell in mid-1978. 
Redemptions responded to the release in June 1979,
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but as prices fell below the release at harvest, direct 
placements were permitted, and farmers placed more 
corn in reserve storage for several months. As the 
drought of 1980 developed, prices rose and the com 
reserve was released in July. Redemptions were made 
continuously for the next 15 months, drawing re­
serves to their lowest level since mid-1978.
An unusual rise in placements occurred during 
this high price period, but there is an explanation. In 
December 1980 Congress waived all interest on re­
serve loans. The data in figure 2.1 suggest that alert 
farmers took this interest-free money (about $1.2 bil­
lion) in December and January, put it in 3-month 
Certificates of Desposit (CD’s), and then paid off the 
loans in March and April 1981. Placements surged 
again after October 1981 as prices fell. Higher loan 
and release prices and a large increase in the number 
of eligible producers were also contributing factors, 
with most placements occurring early in the crop 
year. The following year (1982/83), placements were 
even higher in spite of lower participation rates. In 
this case, extremely low prices and very high reserve 
loans pulled nearly every eligible bushel of com into 
the reserve. Later that year, and in 1983/84, the 
drought and the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program
brought large quantities out of the reserve. This re­
demption activity gradually disappeared as prices 
fell in anticipation of a good 1984/85 crop.
Wheat
The pattern of wheat placements, redemptions, 
and prices is shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4. Both 1976 
and 1977 crop wheat were placed in reserve in 1977 
and 1978, as 9-month loans matured. Wheat prices 
reached the release level in May 1979, and for the 
next 18 months were continuously in and out of re­
lease. After the first 3 months of the release (June to 
August), redeemed quantities were rather small. 
Small placements occurred again after the loan, re­
lease, and call levels were raised in January 1980, but 
they increased in response to the interest waiver of 
December 1980. In crop years 1981/82, and especially 
in 1982/83, placements rose in response to low prices 
and higher loan rates. The redemptions in 1983 and 
1984 were primarily PIK payments and PIK acquisi­
tions by the CCC because prices were far below the 
release level. Direct entry was no longer permitted in 
the 1983/84 crop year so placements could not occur 
until late in the year when 9-month loans matured.
MONTH/TEflR
Figure 2.2. Cora market price and FOR price parameters.
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Jun.77 Dec.77 Jun.78 Dec.78 Jun.79 Dec.79 Jun.80 Dec,80 Jun.81 Dec.81 Jun.82 Dec.82 Jun.83 Dec.83 Jun.84
MONTH/TEfiR
Figure 2.3. Wheat FOR placements and redemptions.
MONTH/TEfiR
Figure 2.4. Wheat market price and FOR price parameters.
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FOR Response to Price
The net effect of placements and redemptions can 
be summarized by looking at ending stocks each 
month (figures 2.5 and 2.6). Both corn and wheat 
ending stocks have fluctuated substantially over the 
7-year period. The monthly data show even more 
variation than the annual data presented in Chapter 
1, especially in 1982/83, when there were large place­
ments during the year followed by large redemptions 
later in the year.
The absolute magnitudes of these stocks should 
be compared with a normal corn crop of about 8000 
million bushels and a normal wheat crop of about 
2500 million bushels. Relative to these production 
levels, the corn reserve came close to being depleted 
twice in the 7-year period: the drought years of 
1980/81 and 1983/84. The wheat reserve has never 
come close to depletion. Thus, we would expect that 
the wheat reserve has had more of a price enhancing 
effect overall than the corn reserve.
Several attempts have been made to measure the 
effect of price changes on reserve quantities. For this 
purpose, reserve quantities can be viewed as an 
added demand by farmers for inventories. Such a 
conceptual model of reserve stocks at the end of a 
period was derived by Meyers and Jolly (1980) from
microeconomic foundations and is shown in figure 
2.7. If the period price is near the release price, little 
change would be expected from the beginning period 
stocks (QRB). As the price falls below the release 
level, reserves tend to increase along demand curve
AB, which could be limited by a constraint (MAX) on 
total reserve quantities. As the price moves above 
release, reserves tend to decline toward zero along
AC.
Because this added component of inventory de­
mand would influence the behavior of markets, it is 
important to have some measure of the price effect or 
price elasticity. The short series on annual data pre­
cludes estimation of the annual elasticities by statis­
tical means, but approximations have been computed 
by Meyers et al. (1981), Morton (1982), and Schouten 
(1985). The results are shown in table 2.1, where 
elasticities are computed at the crop-year average 
price and different quantity levels. The estimates 
vary by year owing to changes in program provisions 
and in the level of reserves. For example, if program 
provisions are more attractive, it is expected that 
farmers’ placements would respond more to a given 
drop in market prices, and the elasticity would be 
greater. When reserve levels are very low, as with 
corn in 1980/81, the response elasticity is also greater.
MONTH/TEflR
Figure 2.5. Monthly ending FOR stocks of corn.
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MONTH/TEflR
Figure 2.6. Monthly ending FOR stocks of wheat.
Although these are crude measures and vary con­
siderably from year to year, they are uniformly large 
elasticities. In fact, it is quite likely that in most 
years reserve grain is more elastic with respect to 
price than any other component of demand. This re­
sult is confirmed for corn by Meyers et al. (1983) in a 
monthly analysis of placement and redemption be­
havior. Monthly price elasticities in the placement 
function ranged from —2.7 to —9.0, and redemption 
function price elasticities ranged from 5.1 to 7.4. 
Schouten (1985) used these monthly models to derive 
an annual relationship between com reserve place­
ments and several key variables, including price and 
program provisions. The price elasticities based on 
annual placements ranged from —1.74 in 1982/83, 
when there was very low participation in acreage 
programs (a requirement for eligibility), to — 4.8 in 
1981/82, when nearly all producers were eligible for 
the reserve program. Quantity
QRB = Beginning FOR stocks.
MAX = Government constraint for FOR size.
Figure 2.7. Conceptual model of ending FOR stocks.
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Table 2 .1 . Computed approxim ations 
q u a n tit ie s  to  p r i c e .
o f  annual response o f g ra in  reserv e
1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81
Meyers e t  a l .  
Wheat ( l in e a r )— 
Wheat ( l o g - lo g )
-2 .8 4
a /
-1 .2 5
-1 .4 0
-4 .1 2
-3 .0 3
b /
b /
Morton
Corn ( l i n e a r ) ^  
Corn ( l in e a r )—
-4 .2 1
-7 .6 7
-2 .0 5
-2 .5 3
-1 .4 4
-1 .4 8
-1 8 .3 0  
-  8.01
Wheat ( l i n e a r ) ^  
Wheat ( l i n e a r ) -
-2 .8 5
-3 .2 5
-1 .2 8
-1 .3 7
-6 .8 4
-5 .3 2
-  4.96
-  5.86
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
Schouten (1985) 
Corn ( l in e a r ) -3 .9 7 - 4 .80 -1 .7 4
a /
b /
ç /
d /
n ot d e fin ed  
n ot computed
Computed a t ending s to ck  le v e ls  
Computed a t average s to ck  l e v e ls .
Table 2 .2  Changes in  co n d it io n s  and p ro v is io n s  from 
estim ated  e f f e c t  on reserv e  p lacem ents.
1981/82 to 1982/83 and
1981/82 1982/83 Estimated
le v e ls le v e ls e f f e c t
Reserve Loan ($ /b u .) 2.55 2 .90  \
(m il .b u .)
R elease P rice  ($ /b u .) 3.15 3.25 /
524
Market P r ice  ( $ /b u . ) a 2 .44 2.33 96
P rodu ction  (m il .b u .) 8202 8359 21
CCC In te r e s t  (%) 14.2 9 .4  V
Market In te r e s t  (%) 14.2 10.0 /
111
TOTAL 752
a Average o f  f i r s t  6 months o f  the crop  yea r.
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FOR Response to Other Factors
In addition to market price, reserve quantities are 
influenced by the loan level, release level, market 
and CCC interest rates, storage payment rates, stor­
age costs, program participation rates, future price 
expectations, and time of entry provisions. Relatively 
little research has yet been completed on the effects of 
these factors. A study by Meyers and Smyth (1984), 
however, demonstrates the relative importance of 
some of them.
Figure 2.1 shows that com placements in crop 
year 1982/83 were larger than those in 1981/82, even 
though the number of farmers eligible for the pro­
gram was much lower in 1982/83. Figure 2.2 shows 
that market prices were lower in 1982/83 and the loan 
rate was much higher. Interest rates also were lower 
in 1982/83, which reduces storage costs. All of these 
could contribute to higher reserve placements, but 
which is most important?
The analysis of Meyers and Smyth found that the 
higher loan and release levels were by far the most 
! important factor causing high placement rates (see 
table 2.2). Low market price and interest rates were 
also important but had about one-fifth the impact of 
the program provisions. More importantly, the loan 
and release levels are under the direct control of 
government program managers, while the other vari­
ables are not. It is clear that the response of farmers is 
very sensitive to program provisions as well as to 
market conditions that exist.
Program managers need to be aware of these ef- 
! fects in making decisions on program provisions. As 
! noted in the first section of this chapter, several 
abrupt changes in reserve program provisions had 
very noticeable effects on placements and redemp­
tions. Chief among these were the changes made to 
j compensate for the embargo of sales to the USSR in 
January 1980, the interest waiver in December 1980, 
and the exceptionally high reserve loan rates in crop 
year 1982/83. Such instability in program manage­
ment can transform this stabilizing program into a 
destabilizing factor in commodity markets.
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Chapter 3
Displacement of Privately Held Stocks by Public Stocks:
A Review of Empirical Studies of the Corn and Wheat Markets
Carl R. Zulauf
Many early studies on public stockholding ig­
nored the role of private storage (for example: 
Cochrane and Danin, 1976; Reutlinger, 1976; and 
Subotnik and Houck, 1976). However, the works of 
Baumes and Meyers (1980), Gadson et al. (1982), Gal- 
lager et al. (1981), Gardner (1979,1981), Helmberger 
and Akinyosoye (1984), Helmberger and Weaver 
(1977), Helmberger et al. (1982), Just (1981), Peck 
(1979), Peck and Gray (1980), Sharpies and Holland 
(1981), and Zulauf (1983) have rectified this deficiency 
and made contributions to understanding the inter­
action between public and private stockholding. Un­
derstanding this interaction is important because 
Gustafson (1958) and Helmberger and Weaver have 
shown theoretically that in a perfectly competitive 
economy, storage by private economic agents will 
maximize net social welfare. Since the private stor­
age market in the United States approximates per­
fect competition (Caves, 1979; Stein et al., 1977), it is 
unlikely, according to social welfare theory, that pub­
lic storage can be cost effective over that provided by 
private storage.
Considerations other than those embodied in eco­
nomic theory, or divergence between social and pri­
vate rates of return may, however, justify accumula­
tion of public stocks. In the United States, public 
storage of agricutural commodities has often been a 
by-product of political concern over low farm income 
and the resulting programs to maintain farm product 
prices above market equilibrium prices. Another con­
cern has been price variability of farm commodities, 
which the accumulation of public stocks is perceived 
to mollify.
If a society decides to maintain public stocks, as 
the United States has, it presumably would desire 
that this be accomplished at minimum cost. One con­
sideration in meeting this goal would be to minimize 
displacement of private stocks by public stocks. In the 
hope of suggesting strategies for minimizing costs by 
minimizing displacement of private stocks, this chap­
ter contains a review of investigations that have esti­
mated the displacement effect.
Overview
Farmers and firms store commodities because 
they expect prices to increase by an amount that 
equals or exceeds the cost of storage. Public stocks, 
whether accumulated by a public agency or through 
storage incentives to private storage agents, cannot 
be released until market price exceeds a specified
The author thanks Wallace Barr, William Meyers, Susan Offutt, 
J. Michael Price, Jerry Sharpies, Bob Spitze, and James Zellner for 
their comments and insights on earlier drafts of this paper.
price. Accumulation of public stocks reduces the like­
lihood not only that market price will exceed the 
release price, but also that expected price may not 
cover the cost of storage. Thus, the incentive for pri­
vate storage is reduced and private stocks will likely 
be displaced by public stocks.
The following review of empirical estimates of the 
displacement effect is limited to studies of the com 
and wheat markets. Displacement of private by pub­
lic storage for these commodities has been investi­
gated by a number of researchers, whereas the 
displacement effect for other agricultural com­
modities has received only limited attention.
Most investigations reviewed (see table 3.1) esti­
mated the following general equation:
Private Stocks = f  (public stocks, private incen­
tive to store).1
The coefficient(s) on the public stock variable(s) 
represent(s) the displacement effect.
With exception of Just’s and one component of 
Gardner’s investigations, the studies reviewed esti­
mated the public stock displacement of private stocks 
carried out of a crop year. Since private carryout 
represents the private trade’s contribution to supply 
for the upcoming crop year, displacement of private 
carryout represents a reduction in the private trade’s 
contribution to stabilizing year-to-year supply. Just 
and Gardner provided estimates of the displacement 
effect based on quarterly corn and wheat stocks. 
Their coefficients, therefore, estimated the reduction 
in the private trade’s contribution to stabilizing 
intrayear as well as interyear supply.
All the reviewed investigations included as public 
stocks those owned by the Commodity Credit Corpo­
ration (CCC), the public agency charged with day-to- 
day operation of public price support and storage 
programs. Studies that included the most recent pe­
riod have also examined the displacement effect of 
grain held in the Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR). Be­
gun in 1977, the FOR program encourages on-farm 
storage by providing extended nonrecourse loans and 
storage and interest subsidies to farmers. Thus, most 
studies defined private stocks as total stocks minus 
CCC owned stocks minus FOR stocks (if post-1977).
Zulauf included stocks held under the regular 
nonrecourse loan and the reseal program as public 
stocks. The regular nonrecourse loan program pro­
vides loans for less than 1 year to farmers who pledge 
their crop as collateral. It is the primary price support
b u st’s model also included as an independent variable a one- 
quarter lag on private stocks, whereas both Just’s and Gardner’s 
quarterly models contained a quarterly shift or dummy variable to 
remove seasonal effects.
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Table 3 .1 :  D isplacem ent o f  p r iv a t e ly  h e ld  sto ck s  by p u b lic  s tock s  
em p irica l estim ates fo r  corn  and wheat, U.S.
In v e s t ig a to r ( s )
P eriod
Commodity stu d ied
Type o f  
model
P u b lic
s to ck
Displacem ent
va lue
Baumes, Meyers Corn 1950-75 Annual CCCa -0.32?-
Wheat 1951-76 Annual CCC -0 .1 4 1
Baumes, Womack Corn 1948-75 Annual CCC -0 .1 7 1 »0
Gadson e t  a l . Corn 1960-79 Annual CCC __c
F0Rb -0 .3 8 k
Wheat 1965-80 Annual CCC __c
FOR -0 .5 5 1
G allagher e t  a l . Wheat 1951-74 Annual CCC
i—
i 
r-t
01
Gardner (1981) Corn 1950-78 Annual CCC 0 .0 1 ,d
FOR -0 .6 1 d
Wheat 1950-78 Annual CCC - o . 4 2;
FOR -0 .7 4 k
Corn 1972-80 Q uarterly FOR -1 .0 4 d
Wheat 1972-80 Q u arterly FOR -0 .9 6 d
Just Corn _e Q u arterly CCC _ f
_e FOR -0 .5 2
Wheat _e Q u arterly CCC -0 .0 4_e FOR -0 .8 1 1
Peck Wheat 1950-74 Annual CCC -0 .1 2 1
P rice  (updates Corn Annual CCC __c
Gadson e t  a l . ) FOR -0 .2 6 1
Wheat Annual CCC __c
FOR -0 .3 0 1
S h arp ies , H olland Wheat 1972-78 Annual FOR -0 .1 4 d >8
Zulauf Corn 1954-74 Annual Loanb -0 .0 1
(Loan)2 »1■ -0 .8 2 1
CCC it -0.30-1;
(CCC)2 0.52^
Wheat 1954-74 Annual Loan -0.35?-
(Loan)2 0.81?-
CCC -0 .1 5 1
(CCC)2 0.07
a Stocks owned by Commodity Credit Corporation.
b Stocks held in Farmer-Owned Reserve.
c Level of stocks owned by CCC was hypothesized to affect 
commercial stock levels. Its coefficient was insignificant and was 
dropped from the equation reported in the study.
'The coefficient was not reported, but in the text it was indicated that 
the coefficient was insignificant.
s No significance level was reported although the coefficient was 
apparently significant at the 1 percent level.
h Stocks held by farmers under CCC loan.
dThe estimated coefficient of the public stocks variable represented 
the proportional addition to total stocks contributed by the public 
stocks. Therefore, the displacement value of private stocks by public 
stocks, the value presented in the table, equals the estimated 
coefficient minus one. The level of significance refers to the estimated 
coefficient, not the coefficient presented in the table.
8 The dates covered were not reported.
'Stocks held by farmers under CCC loan, the quantity squared. 
¡Coefficient significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level, 
kCoefficient significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
'Coefficient significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
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mechanism. The reseal program, which was in effect 
before FOR was enacted, allowed a farmer to carry 
grain under nonrecourse loan for an additional pe­
riod. The farmer was allowed to keep the original loan 
with the grain as collateral, and a storage subsidy 
was usually paid. Interest continued to accrue on the 
original loan.
Zulauf reasoned that, once grain was placed under 
loan, farmers would sell loan stocks on the private 
market only when market price exceeded the loan 
rate plus accumulated interest and any other 
charges. In this respect, the loan rate adjusted for 
accumulated storage costs is a public stock release 
price for grain previously accumulated under a non­
recourse loan. Consequently, in Zulaufs investiga­
tion, which excluded the FOR period, private stocks 
were defined as what are often referred to as "free” 
stocks: total stocks minus CCC owned stocks and loan 
stocks.
The displacement effect of public stocks on private 
stocks should be related to the degree to which public 
stocks are sheltered from the market. The higher the 
release price of public stocks, given all other condi­
tions, the lower the likelihood public stocks will be 
released onto the private market. Public stocks 
should, therefore, affect the price expectations of pri­
vate storers to a smaller degree, and the displace­
ment effect should also be smaller.
By applying this line of argument to the pre-FOR 
period, loan stocks should have a larger displacement 
effect than CCC owned stocks. The latter’s release 
price was 105 percent or more of the loan rate plus 
monthly storage charges from the beginning of the 
crop marketing year. Hence, they were further from 
I the market than loan stocks. In the FOR era, FOR’s 
I release price has been based on various markups of 
the loan rate. The release price on CCC owned stocks 
has always been higher than the FOR release price.
■  Thus, displacement of private stocks should be great- 
■ est for loan stocks, next greatest for FOR stocks, and 
least for CCC owned stocks.
For the 1986 com and wheat crop years, however, 
the displacement effect for CCC owned stocks should 
be greater than the displacement effect for FOR 
I stocks. The greater displacement value for CCC 
I stocks is expected because the Food Security Act of 
I 1985 establishes the release price of CCC stocks as 
115 percent of the loan rate. This price ($2.21 for 1986 
I com and $2.76 for 1986 wheat) is lower than the 
current release price on FOR stocks ($3.15-$3.25 for 
I com and $4.50 for wheat) as well as 1985 nonrecourse 
loan grain (around $3.70 for corn and $3.55 for 
wheat).
The private-incentive-to-store variable in the esti- 
' mated equations was proxied by a number of different 
variables. Baumes and Meyers, Baumes and Womack 
(1979), Gadson et al., Gallagher et al., and Just used 
various combinations of current year’s price, current 
year’s production, and next year’s expected or actual 
production to proxy expected price change, i.e., the 
private market’s incentive to store. Gardner used 
only current year’s supply as the proxy. He based this 
choice on Gustafson’s finding that "when year-to-year
fluctuations are due to random variation in produc­
tion around a fixed mean, and demand and storage 
costs are constant, profit-seeking stockholding re­
sults in a storage function in which ending stocks are 
a function of beginning supply only” (Gardner 1981, 
p.9). Peck and Zulauf used the spread between old 
crop and new crop futures to proxy the private market 
storage incentive whereas Sharpies and Holland 
used expected price, measured as a 3-year moving 
average of past prices, minus the current price. Both 
variables are based on Working’s (1948,1949) price of 
storage theory.
Summary of Empirical Findings
The value estimated for the displacement of pri­
vate stocks by public stocks is affected not only by the 
commodity analyzed but also by the types of public 
stocks included in the estimated equation, the vari­
ables used to measure private market storage incen­
tives, the period of analysis, and the characteristics of 
the public storage program. At least one and usually 
more of these factors varied between and among the 
investigations reviewed, so comparison of the esti­
mated displacement effects requires caution.
Given this caution, the displacement estimates of 
CCC stocks for the pre-FOR period seem remarkably 
consistent. The values ranged from —0.17 to —0.32 
for corn CCC stocks and from —0.12 to —0.15 for 
wheat CCC stocks. All coefficients were significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percent level of signifi­
cance. The estimates imply that each bushel added to 
CCC owned stocks reduced private stocks by no more 
than one-third bushel for corn and one-sixth bushel 
for wheat.
For investigations that covered the post-FOR pe­
riod, the estimated displacement effect of CCC stocks 
was generally not significantly different from zero. 
The only exception was Gardner’s estimate for wheat 
in his annual model ( -  0.42). Three of the five esti­
mates for the displacement effect of com FOR stocks 
found it not significantly different from zero 
(Gardner, annual and quarterly model, and Just). 
Price’s update (1984) of Gadson et al. found signifi­
cant displacement effects of -  0.38 and -  0.26. The 
displacement effect estimated for wheat FOR stocks 
varied greatly—from zero (Gardner, quarterly analy­
sis) to -  0.81 (Just)—and each was statistically sig­
nificant. Four of the six estimates equaled or 
exceeded a 30 percent displacement (Gadson et al.; 
Gardner, annual; Price; and Just). Thus, the displace­
ment of private stocks by FOR com stocks seems no 
larger than 0.25 bushel while the displacement by 
FOR wheat stocks is at least 0.3 bushel.
The bulk of the statistical evidence suggests that 
the displacement effect of FOR stocks exceeds the 
displacement effect of CCC stocks since the initiation 
of the FOR program in 1977 and that the displace­
ment effect of CCC stocks is minimal, if not zero. Both 
findings are consistent with the release price on FOR 
stocks being lower than the release price on CCC 
stocks during the period studied. Because of FOR’s 
lower release price, the probability of releasing FOR
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stocks was greater than the probability of releasing 
CCC stocks. Therefore, FOR’s displacement effect 
should be greater. Furthermore, as long as relatively 
large FOR stocks exist, the CCC stocks were probably 
viewed as redundant by the private trade. Thus, the 
displacement effect of CCC stocks should be minimal 
or zero.
Zulauf was the only investigator to estimate a 
nonlinear displacement effect. Three of the four esti­
mated coefficients for the squared terms were signifi­
cantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of 
significance. Future investigators may want to incor­
porate a nonlinear displacement effect.
Conclusions
Most of the studies reviewed found that public 
stocks have displaced private stocks in the corn and 
wheat markets. However, the displacement was gen­
erally much less than 100 percent. Public stock pro­
grams seem to have increased total stocks of corn and 
wheat.
The studies also generally support the argument 
that the closer the release price is to the market price, 
the greater the displacement effect. For example, the 
displacement effect of FOR stocks exceeds that of 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) owned stocks 
in the period since the FOR program began (1977). 
Thus, if the release price of public stocks is lowered to 
make the storage program more market oriented, the 
cost of public storage programs in terms of displaced 
private stocks would be expected to increase. This 
conclusion does not imply that the total cost of public 
storage programs would increase but only the dis­
placement component of overall program cost.
Statistical investigations that cover the period 
after FOR began suggest that the displacement effect 
of CCC-owned stocks is minimal. CCC stocks are 
probably viewed by private storage agents as emer­
gency reserve stocks, which are unlikely to be re­
leased unless a substantial imbalance develops 
between supply and demand and causes a large in­
crease in price. In the current surplus production 
situation, this sequence of events seems unlikely. 
Consequently, the cost of maintaining CCC stocks 
could become very large. To reduce these costs, CCC 
stocks will have to be reduced either through re­
designing the current public storage program or 
through using CCC stocks in market development 
programs.
As mentioned, for the 1986 crop year the release 
price for com and wheat CCC stocks will be lower 
than for FOR stocks and 1985 loan stocks, i.e., the 
storage programs have been redesigned. To the ex­
tent that surplus conditions continue and CCC stocks 
continue adequate to meet production shortfalls, cur­
rent release price for existing FOR and 1985 loan 
grain will have to be reduced or farmers will even­
tually default all this grain to CCC. Since loan rates 
and, thus, CCC sale price will probably continue to 
decline under the Food Security Act o f1985 and sur­
plus production capacity will probably continue, pol­
icy makers will have to eventually confront the
redundancy between CCC and FOR grain. It would 
seem that either one or the other is unnecessary and 
should be a candidate for elimination or substantial 
redefinition of purpose.
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Chapter 4
Reserve Implications of Feed-grain/Livestock Interaction
Susan E. Offutt
To mitigate price instability in grain markets, the 
United States has, over the period since WWII, oper­
ated a system of reserve grain stocks. Until the late 
1970s, the government-held reserve of the Com­
modity Credit Corporation (CCC), accumulated as a 
consequence of overproduction, was the primary 
buffer against extreme price variability. With the 
creation of the Farmer-Owned Reserve in 1977 the 
buffer function was transferred, at least in part, to the 
control of individual farmers. Under either system, 
one function of the reserve was to hold grain off the 
market in periods of depressed prices and to release 
stocks when prices were relatively high. The reserves 
have generally moderated the effects of exogenous 
market shocks on grain prices. For com and the other 
feed grains, however, adjustment in the domestic U.S. 
livestock sector may also have contributed to price 
stability.
Each year, two-thirds of the U.S. feed grain crop 
becomes the principal feed staple for the domestic 
livestock industry. The linkage between these two 
sectors is strong and also complex, given the hetero­
geneity of livestock production functions. As the 
United States has emerged as the world’s leading 
exporter of corn, which is the dominant U.S. feed 
grain, the effects of events in these world markets 
have been transmitted to the domestic livestock in­
dustry. In some years, price swings have been quite 
large. Significant adjustment has occurred in the 
livestock sector, which displays more responsiveness 
than the other sources of demand for U.S. corn, such 
as domestic food, industrial uses, and exports (Offutt 
and Blandford, 1984, p. 321).
The livestock sector is thus affected by move­
ments in grain prices and so by grain stabilization 
policies. There is no corresponding livestock reserve, 
for the obvious reason of perishibility of the products, 
but neither has there been any other type of livestock 
price support policy as is common among the grains. 
Over the past 50 years the livestock sector (excluding 
dairy) has rarely been explicitly considered in the 
design of U.S. commodity stabilization and support 
schemes, although these programs have important 
implications for livestock prices and supply.
The nature of the interdependence between the 
feed-grain (with particular reference to corn) and 
livestock sectors is discussed in the first section of 
this chapter. In the second section, the extent to 
which the livestock sector has in the past functioned 
a£> a complement to the corn reserve is analyzed. 
Finally, the implications for reserve management of 
the livestock/feed-grain interdependence are 
explored.
Feed-grain/Livestock Interdependence
To understand this sectoral interdependence, the 
livestock sector must be considered at a disaggre­
gated level to illustrate differences among biological, 
technical, and economic aspects of the various live­
stock production processes. United States hog and 
cattle production together account for two-thirds of 
all com fed. The remainder is split between the dairy 
and poultry industries. Because of their quantitative 
importance and longer run supply cycles, the hog and 
cattle sectors are the focus of the discussion on sec­
toral interdependence.
In both sectors, corn use is a function of the level of 
animal output. Animal numbers may be regarded as 
largely fixed within about 1 year for cattle and 6 
months for hogs. The slaughter of breeding herd 
numbers can increase short run production, but ex­
pansion takes as much as 3 years in the cattle sector 
and 2 years for hogs. Consequently, it is mainly live­
stock prices, rather than numbers, that adjust in the 
short run to clear markets. Given animal numbers, 
short run sectoral response to changes in com price 
depends on ration flexibility (the availability of sub­
stitutes for corn) and on production flexibility (ability 
to modify output with no change in animal numbers). 
Longer run response depends on the manner in which 
expected prices affect inventory adjustment.
In the beef sector, corn use is primarily a function 
of the level of fed cattle production. In the short run, 
corn price can affect fed beef production through the 
slaughter mix of fed versus nonfed beef and through 
the average finished weight of fed cattle. Slaughter of 
nonfed beef (at weights less than those of feedlot 
animals) depends on the feeder cattle price, which is 
itself a positive function of the fed-beef/com-price 
ratio. So, in the short run, an increase in corn price 
(which will decrease feeder cattle price) tends to in­
crease the supply of nonfed beef as cattle bypass 
feedlots and are fattened on forage. In the longer run, 
corn price affects breeding inventories through its 
effect on the number of cows slaughtered (another 
source of nonfed beef in the short run) and heifers 
added as replacements or net additions to the herd.
In the hog sector, corn use is determined by the 
number of animals raised. Here, there are few sub­
stitutes for corn and no fed/nonfed marketing option. 
There is less latitude for hog producers in adjusting 
the size of the finished animal. So, hog producers are, 
within a 6-month period, price takers. Price is depen­
dent on current barrow and gilt supply, a quantity 
determined by the previous period’s pig crop, itself a 
function of inventory decisions made at least 1-year 
earlier. The slaughter of breeding sows represents the 
only short-run adjustment option.
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Underlying these adjustment possibilities are 
production cycles, induced by a combination of eco­
nomic and biological phenomena. An average of 10 
years has elapsed between peaks in cattle numbers; 
in the hog cycle, the interval has been about 3 years. 
In the previous decade, the cattle cycle peaked during 
the 1975/76 crop year and that of hogs in 1973/74 and 
again in 1976/77. The significance of the cyclical 
movement is that price responsive corn demand in 
the hog and cattle sectors is most inelastic when 
animal numbers are highest. Consequently, market 
shocks during this period may cause large corn price 
gyrations that feed back into cycles through their 
effects on production and inventory decisions. Al­
though the phase of the cycles is not expected to 
change appreciably when such shocks occur, the am­
plitude of the cycles may be affected as producers 
make short-run adjustments in output and feed use. 
Therefore, corn and livestock market response to 
shocks will depend on their timing and sequence as 
well as their magnitude.
Livestock Sector as Price Buffer
The importance of the livestock sector as a con­
sumer of corn and other feed grains suggests that it 
may be a source of substantial adjustment when dis­
ruptions occur in the corn market. Donaldson (1984), 
for example, has identified three components of an 
international grain reserve: aggregate trade flows, 
nongovernmental stocks, and grain being fed to 
livestock.
T h e feed -grain  buffer has been tested over the  
past decade and h as provided an  effective and  
su r p r is in g ly  t im e ly  resp on se  to  p rod u ction  
shortfalls. For exam ple, w hen grain  prices rose 
du rin g 1 9 7 2 -7 4 , the feed consum ption adjust­
m en t m ech an ism  proved extrem ely robust and  
the drop in  U .S . feed consum ption in  1 9 7 3 -7 4  
w as as large  as th e  to ta l g lo b a l production  
shortfall, (p.189)
Whether the livestock sector really functions as a 
food-grain buffer, as Donaldson seems to suggest, is 
not immediately obvious; its feed-grain price moder­
ating capabilities, however, are incontestable.
The decade of the 1970s saw rather dramatic corn 
price instability. Stocks did not overhang the corn 
market as in the wheat market; total carryover was 
an average of only 13 percent of production over the 
past decade, in contrast to 46 percent for wheat. Gov­
ernment-controlled stocks were small, and were, in 
fact, zero from 1973/74 through 1976/77. Conse­
quently, adequate stocks were not available for re­
lease at times of peak demand and/or reduced supply. 
Over this period, then, the livestock sector repre­
sented a source of adjustment that helped mitigate 
corn-price instability.
The most responsive components of that demand 
are the cattle and hog corn-feeding sectors. Further, 
the amount of their responsiveness varies over the 
courses of their respective production cycles. Derived
demand for corn is most inelastic when animal num­
bers are at their highest. At the peak of the cattle 
cycle, the elasticity of corn use with respect to com 
price is -0 .95 . At the cycle’s trough, this same elas­
ticity is -1.95. Both values are compared with the 
mean value of -1 .6  at the sample means (Offutt and 
Blandford, 1984, p. 322). In the hog sector, the elas­
ticity of com use in the short run (6-month period) is 
approximately zero, but 1 year later, after the size of 
the pig crop has been adjusted, the elasticity of com 
use with respect to lagged corn price is —2.1, calcu­
lated at sample means. By contrast, this same elas­
ticity is —1.1 at the cycle’s peak and -2 .7  at the 
trough (Offutt and Blandford, 1984, p. 322). This re­
sponsiveness indicates substantial scope for adjust­
ment, a capability that varies with position in the 
production cycle.
Reserve Implications of Interdependence
The interdependence of the livestock and corn and 
feed-grain sectors suggests that the buffering capac­
ity of the livestock sector might be considered inter­
changeable with that of a reserve grain stock. In the 
former instance, however, adjustment occurs accord­
ing to market signals, while in the latter some degree 
of government intervention in decision making is 
implied. Moreover, the costs of adjustment are borne 
by producers of hogs and cattle (particularly at the 
cow-calf level), as opposed to also being shared by 
grain producers and taxpayers under a reserve sys­
tem. The desirability of one approach to adjustment 
and stabilization over another depends on society’s 
view of the equity of cost sharing.
The nature of the interdependence of the feed- 
grain and livestock sectors implies that trade offs 
exist on price level and stability between the two 
sectors. Consequently, there is no single corn reserve 
management scheme that will simultaneously sta­
bilize and keep buoyant both the complexes of feed- 
grain and livestock prices (see Offutt and Blandford, 
1984). Without a commodity program that supports 
livestock producers directly, providing stability, and 
perhaps even prosperity, to that sector is not consis­
tently possible with a feed-grain reserve manage­
ment scheme in which activity is governed only by 
changes in feed-grain prices. A corn reserve might be 
managed, however, with greater sensitivity to im­
pacts on the livestock sector. In the past, the Farmer- 
Owned Reserve management has made some conces­
sion to the interests of livestock producers by narrow­
ing the band within which feed-grain (corn) price 
could fluctuate without triggering grain release or 
accumulation. Nonetheless, this approach has no sen­
sitivity to the revenue position of livestock producers. 
This is a failing of all price stabilization schemes, 
however, and is not peculiar to this context.
Suppose the corn reserve assumes some of the 
adjustment to market changes previously borne by 
the livestock sector. Such an orientation would imply 
particular attention to mitigating the effects of mar­
ket shocks that raise corn price because increases in
2 6 0
input prices would be of greatest importance to live­
stock producers. The cyclical production patterns in 
the cattle and hog industries in particular imply that 
market shocks during peak livestock production peri­
ods, when derived com demand is most inelastic, both 
raise and destabilize corn price, resulting in a de­
crease in the amplitude of cyclical livestock produc­
tion at these peaks. Release of reserve grain, 
therefore, should be guided with reference to the level 
of livestock populations as well.
For the United States, the problem of stabilization 
of the feed/livestock economy is complicated by its 
position as the dominant supplier to the world com 
market. In addition, because the most price-respon­
sive component of U.S. com demand is U.S. livestock 
production, adjustment to international market 
stocks often occurs domestically. The linkage be­
tween trade and domestic support and reserve pol­
icies is of particular importance in the feed/livestock 
markets, then, because of the domestic sector’s sen­
sitivity to events in the world market. Reserve man­
agement should be alert to the possibility that action 
may be required in years when both export demand 
and domestic livestock production are high. Without 
a corresponding price or income support program for 
livestock, the most a grain reserve scheme can accom­
plish is a moderation of the livestock sector’s costs of 
adjustment, not a complete shift of those costs to the 
federal treasury or grain producers.
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Chapter 5
Evaluations of the Reserve Program
William H. M eyers and D. Craig Smyth
Several independent evaluations of the Farmer- 
Owned Reserve (FOR) program have been conducted 
over the past few years. The techniques and scope of 
these analyses differ, but the range of results ob­
tained provides a basis for some generalizations 
about the performance of this program. This review 
covers the impacts of the reserve program on price 
levels, price variability, farm income, and govern­
ment costs, although not all studies were carried 
through to the income and cost effects.
Estimated Price Impact
One would expect the FOR to increase farm grain 
prices when the reserve was growing and decrease 
prices when reserve stocks were released into the 
market. The FOR grew most years from its beginning 
in 1977 until 1983; large quantities of com were re­
leased during the drought year 1980/81, and the 
drought and payment-in-kind (PIK) program in 
1983/84 greatly reduced FOR stocks of both wheat 
and corn. The studies reviewed here cover various 
time periods, but few go beyond 1982. Thus, one 
would expect historical studies to show that the FOR 
increased farmers’ grain prices, especially for wheat.
Most of these studies compared two reserve policy 
alternatives. The first policy was the total farm policy 
package that actually existed, including the FOR. 
The second was the same as the first except the FOR 
was assumed to not exist and the release price of 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) owned stocks 
was assumed to be 115 percent of the loan, rather than 
the much higher release price that actually existed. 
The studies by Just (1981), Gardner (1981a), and Mor­
ton et al. (1984) had no reserve program of any kind in 
their alternative scenario.
The wide range of analytical techniques and peri­
ods represented by these studies is shown in table 5.1. 
Most are econometric models, but Sharpies (1980) as 
well as Meyers and Ryan (1981) used previously esti­
mated elasticities to simulate market behavior. Just, 
Morton et al., Salathe et al. (1984), and Smyth (1985) 
included the livestock and crop sector interactions. 
The other studies used single-commodity models 
even when both wheat and corn were evaluated. In 
Sharpies (1980), Morton et al., and Smyth, FOR 
quantities were endogenous and sensitive to prices, 
while the other studies modeled them as exogenous. 
Gardner (1981a) used single-equation methods, 
Sharpies (1980) and Morton et al. used stochastic 
simulation analysis, and the rest employed determin­
The authors are grateful to Jerry A. Sharpies for helpful 
comments.
istic simulations to compare alternatives. The varia­
tion in approach is emphasized because differences in 
results might be explained by differences in methods 
or assumptions.
Estimated price impacts are, in general, sensitive 
to the assumed size of the substitution effect between 
reserves and private stocks (see Chapter 3). In table 
5.2, for example, the 1978 estimated price impact of 
the FOR for wheat by Sharpies and Holland (1980) is 
+ 23 percent if the substitution effect is -  0.13 and 
+ 7 percent if substitution is -  0.6. The 1979 estimate 
for wheat by Meyers and Ryan is + 26 percent with a 
substitution of —0.2 and +14 percent with a —0.4 
substitution coefficient.
The price impacts are greater in years when large 
crops were harvested. For substitution effects of at 
least 0.3 in absolute terms, the range for wheat price 
impacts is from 4 percent in 1977 up to 14 percent in 
1979 and 1981. The range for com is from — 5 percent 
in 1980, a drought year, up to + 7 percent in 1978. The 
difference in alternative estimates for given years 
amounts to only 2 or 3 percentage points except in the 
case of corn in 1980. Meyers and Ryan estimate a 5- 
percent decrease in price for 1980 because of the ex­
haustion of CCC stocks under the "NO-FOR” sce­
nario. Salathe et al. estimate a 1-percent increase in 
price due to the FOR. The difference could be a result 
of the use by the earlier study of Meyers and Ryan of a 
preliminary estimate that 750 million bushels of 
FOR stocks would be released in 1980/81. In fact, only 
451 million bushels were released, the figure used by 
Salathe et al.
The summary of impacts over the entire period of 
each study provides a measure of the overall price 
impact of the FOR program. The longer the period of 
analysis, the more useful the estimates are in eval­
uating the effectiveness of the reserve. For com, the 
estimates of Gardner (1981a)(2 years), Salathe et al. 
(5 years), and Smyth (20 quarters) all show a 3-4 
percent corn price increase as a result of the FOR. 
The other estimates range from 9 percent by Morton 
et al. (10 years) to -1 4  percent by Just (8 quarters). 
There is less agreement on the wheat price impact 
estimates. Salathe et al. and Meyers and Ryan esti­
mate about a 10-percent price increase, Morton et al. 
show no impact and Just finds a 27-percent decrease. 
The Just results are contrary to all others and diffi­
cult to explain, especially since the analysis was con­
fined to a period when acquisitions exceeded releases 
by more than 200 million bushels for wheat and over 
600 million bushels for corn.
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Table 5 .1 . Overview o f  m ajor em p irica l s tu d ies  o f  the Farmer-Owned Reserve 
program
Author
Program
commodity Purpose o f  study Model type
Sharpies (1980) wheat co n tra s t  a b i l i t y  o f  
a lte r n a t iv e  stora ge  
p o l i c i e s  in  m eeting 
c e r ta in  o b je c t iv e s
WHEATSIMa 
(nonestim ated , 
annual)
Meyers and 
Ryan (1981)
corn  and 
wheat
estim ate e f f e c t s  o f  
FOR on p r i c e s ,  s to c k s , 
and p rod u ction
5 -eq u ation  
dynamic models 
(nonestim ated , 
annual)
Gardner (1981a) corn  and 
wheat
estim ate e f f e c t s  o f  
FOR on p r ic e s  and 
stock s
s e r ie s  o f  s in g le  
equations (annual, 
q u a rterly )
Just (1981) corn  and 
wheat
estim ate e f f e c t s  o f  FOR 
on gra in  p r ic e s  and 
s to ck s , and l iv e s to c k  
p r ic e s  and p rod u ction
34-equ ation  model 
o f  co rn , wheat, 
l iv e s t o c k  markets 
(q u a rte r ly )
Morton e t  a l .  
(1984)
corn  and 
wheat
estim ate e f f e c t s  o f  FOR 
and a lte r n a tiv e  p o l i c i e s  
on gra in  and l iv e s to c k  
p r ic e s
35-eq u a tion  model 
o f  feed  g ra in , 
w heat, l iv e s to c k  
markets (annual)
S a la th e , Banker, 
and P rice  (1984)
a l l  program 
commodities 
but r i c e
estim ate e f f e c t s  o f  FOR | 
on gra in  and l iv e s to c k  
m arkets, farm incom e, 
and government co s ts
FAPSIMb
(annual)
Smyth (1985) corn estim ate the e f f e c t s  
o f  FOR on p r ic e  le v e l  
and v a r ia b i l i t y
49-equ ation  model 
o f  corn  and 
l iv e s t o c k  markets 
(q u a rte r ly )
aWHEATSIM i s  a sim u lation  model o f  the U.S. wheat m arket, d e scr ib e d  in  
d e t a i l  in  H olland and Sharpies (1978)
bFAPSIM i s  a comprehensive model o f  the U.S. crops and l iv e s t o c k  s e c to r s . 
The s tru c tu ra l equations o f  the model are d iscu ssed  in  Gadson e t  a l .
cbushel fo r  bushel s u b s t itu t io n  o f  reserve  stock s  fo r  fr e e  sto ck s  used in  
the commercial in ven tory  demand equations
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Table 5.1 continued
Treatment o f  
FOR stock s
S u b stitu tio n
c o e f f i c i e n t 0 Method o f  a n a ly s is
endogenous -0 .  A
(assumed)
s to c h a s t ic  s im u la tion  o f  a lte r n a t iv e  
p o l i c i e s  over p e r io d  1977 /78 -1983 /84 , 
using randomly s e le c te d  shocks to  U.S. 
wheat y ie ld  and e x p o rts .
exogenous - 0 .2 ,  -0 .4  
(assumed)
d e te rm in is t ic  s im u la tion  o f  FOR and 
a lte r n a t iv e  p o l i c y  fo r  p e r io d  1977-1981, 
under each o f  the s u b s t itu t io n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s .
exogenous
-0 .7 4  wheat 
-0 .6 1  corn  
(estim ated)
g ra p h ica l a n a ly s is  and sim ple re g re ss io n s  
fo r  s tora ge  r u le s ,  and p r ic e  dependent 
equations
exogenous
-0 .8 1  wheat 
-0 .5 2  corn  
(estim ated )
d e te rm in is t ic  s im u la tion  o f  estim ated  
m odel, and estim ated  model w ith  a l l  FOR 
v a r ia b le s  removed fo r  p e r io d  1 9 7 7 III - 
1979II
endogenous
-0 .2 4  wheat 
-0 .2 6  corn  
(estim ated)
s to c h a s t ic  s im u lation  o f  a lte r n a t iv e  
p o l i c i e s  over p e r io d  1981-1990, using  
randomly s e le c te d  shocks to  U .S. crop  
y ie ld s  and exp orts
exogenous
-0 .5 5  wheat 
-0 .3 8  corn  
(estim ated)
d e te rm in is t ic  s im u la tion  o f  estim ated  
model w ith  a l l  FOR v a r ia b le s  removed, 
compared w ith  a ctu a l market outcomes fo r  
1977-1981
endogenous -0 .3 5 4
(estim ated )
d e te rm in is t ic  s im u la tion  o f  estim ated  
model w ith  and w ithout the FOR program 
over the p e r io d  1977IV -  1982III
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Table 5 .2 . Estim ated im pacts o f  the FOR on season average p r ic e s
Year Commodity Source—^
S u b stitu tio n
e f f e c t
assumed
Annual 
percen t 
change in  
p r ic e
Annual Impacts
1977/78 Wheat Sharpies and H olland - .1 3 +4
Wheat Salathe e t  a l . - .3 0 +4
Corn Salathe e t  a l . - .3 7 + 1
1978/79 Wheat Sharpies and H olland - .1 3 +23
Wheat Sharpies and H olland - . 6 +7
Wheat Meyers and Ryan - . 2 +10
Wheat Meyers and Ryan - .A +10
Wheat Salathe e t  a l . - . 3 +10
Corn Meyers and Ryan - . 2 +7
Corn Meyers and Ryan - . 4 +5
Corn Salathe e t  a l . - .3 7 +6
1979/80 Wheat Meyers and Ryan - . 2 +26
Wheat Meyers and Ryan - . 4 +14
Wheat Salathe e t  a l . - . 3 +12
Corn Meyers and Ryan - . 2 +4
Corn Meyers and Ryan - . 4 +3
Corn Salathe e t  a l . - .3 7 +4
1980/81 Wheat Meyers and Ryan - . 2 + 11
Wheat Meyers and Ryan - . 4 +7
Wheat Salathe e t  a l . - . 3 + 10
Corn Meyers and Ryan - . 2 -6
Corn Meyers and Ryan - . 4 -5
Corn Salathe e t  a l . - .3 7 +1
1981/82 Wheat Salathe e t  a l . - . 3 + 14
Corn
P eriod  Impacts
Salathe e t  a l . - .3 7 +2
1977/78-
1978/79
Grain Gardner (1981a) - .7 5 +4
1977/78- Wheat Salathe e t  a l . - . 3 + 10
1981/82 Corn Salathe e t  a l . - .3 7 +3
1978/79- Wheat Meyers and Ryan - . 2  to  - . 4 +11 to  +7
1980/81 Corn Meyers and Ryan - . 2  to  - . 4 0
1981/82- Wheat Morton e t  a l . - .2 4 0
1990/91 Corn Morton e t  a l . - .2 6 9
1 9 7 7 III - Wheat Just - .8 1 -27
1979II Corn Just - .5 2 -14
1977IV-
1982III
Corn Smyth - .3 5 +3
— See r e fe r e n c e s .
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Price Variability Implications
Whether or not the FOR reduces price variability 
depends on the nature of the supply and demand 
shocks in the period of the analysis. Under moderate 
supply and demand shocks, the CCC program may 
provide more stability because the acquisition and 
release prices are close together. If the shocks are 
large, the CCC program would more quickly run out 
of stocks, which would lead to more extreme price 
fluctuations.
If variability is defined as the standard deviation 
or variance of price, the measured impact of the FOR 
will be sensitive to the effect of the reserve in enhanc­
ing prices as well as in stabilizing them because the 
standard deviation increases as the level of prices
increases over a specified period of time. Since the 
FOR increased prices from 1977-81, for example, it 
may be hypothesized that the standard deviation also 
increased (this was true in some situations). If so, one 
may want to use the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation relative to the mean value), but this refine­
ment does not guarantee that a given time series 
revision will exhibit increased or decreased vari­
ability. Both standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation measures are reported in the results that 
follow.
Six studies have estimated price variability ef­
fects. In the first four (Meyers and Ryan, Salathe et 
al., Just, Smyth), the estimates are derived from de­
terministic simulations over a historical period (table 
5.3). The last two (Morton et al. and Sharpies, 1980)
Table 5 .3 . Estim ated im pacts o f  the FOR on p r ic e  v a r ia b i l i t y  (measured by the
standard d e v ia t io n ) .
Wheat Corn
Source (p er iod ) S.D. C.V. S.D. C.V.
Meyers and Ryan (1978-80)
Without FOR (using - .A ) .56 .166 .54 .203
With FOR .47 .130 .42 .158
Percent change -16 -22 -22 -22
Salathe e t  a l .  (1977-81)
Without FOR .47 .154 .55 .224
With FOR .58 .174 .55 .216
Percent change +23 +13 0 -4
Just (1 9 7 7 III-1 9 7 9 II)
Without FOR 1.79 .474 1.08 .452
With FOR 0.35 .127 0 .20 .097
Percent Change -80 -73 -81 -79
Smyth (1977IV -1982III)
W ithout FOR none .54 .220
With FOR .34 .135
Percent Change -37 -39
Morton e t  a l .  (lO S l-O O )-/
Without FOR 2.50 .710 .92 .393With FOR 1.21 .342 .76 .300
Percent change -52 -52 -17 -24
Sharpies (1980) (1 9 7 7 -8 3 )- /
Without FOR 1.89 .511 none
With FOR 1.40 .369
P ercent change -26 -28
S.D. -  standard d e v ia t io n
C.V. = c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r ia t io n  (standard d e v ia t io n  d iv id e d  by the mean)
-  S to ch a stic  s im u lation s conducted over a fo r e c a s t  p e r io d  under h y p o th e t ica l 
p o l i c y  a lte r n a t iv e s .
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are derived from stochastic simulations over a fore­
cast period. The latter method provides a more reli­
able estimate of variation since it is based on many 
more simulations, a wider range of possible supply 
and demand shocks, and consistent program man­
agement rules.
All the results, except the Salathe et al. estimates, 
indicate that the FOR significantly reduced price 
variability in terms of both measures of variability. 
For wheat, the variability impacts estimated by Mor­
ton et al. and Just are substantially larger than the 
others. For corn, the impacts estimated by Just are 
far larger than the others.
As noted, the stochastic simulation technique 
used by Morton et al. and Sharpies (1980) is a more 
robust test of the general stabilizing effects of the
FOR because it can cover a broader range of potential 
market conditions. These studies, however, neces­
sarily impose a set of consistent reserve management 
rules that are always followed. The historical simula­
tions, by contrast, take the reserve management as it 
actually occurred. Thus, the reserve may have been 
destabilizing if a consistent set of management rules 
was not followed.
Farm Income and Government Cost
Two of the studies provide estimates of farm re­
ceipts and government cost impacts of the FOR. The 
Salathe et al. study is the most complete, covering 
crops and livestock receipts, aggregate net farm in­
come, and various categories of budget outlays.
Table 5 .4 .  Estim ated Farm Income and Government Cost Impacts o f  the FOR
Wheat Corn T ota l—^
(B i l l i o n  D o lla rs )
Meyers and Ryan (77 -80)
Value o f  p rod u ction 2 .9 -3 .7 1 .4 -1 .7 4 .3 -5 .4
(% change) (10 -15) (2 -3 ) (4 .4 -5 .5 )
D e fic ie n c y  payments - .5 5 - .3 0 - .8 5
Sum o f  above 2 .4 -3 .2 1 .1 -1 .4 3 .5 -4 .6
(per year) ( . 6 - .8 ) ( .2 8 - .3 5 ) ( .8 7 -1 .1 )
Salathe e t  a l .  (77 -81)
Farm r e c e ip t s 5 .4
D e fic ie n c y  payments -1 .3
Net farm income 3 .9
(per year) ( .7 8 )
G ovt, c o s t  (7 8 -8 2 )—^
R ecoverable 6 .96
N onrecoverable (m ainly d e f ic ie n c y  payments) -0 .7 9
T ota l 6.17
—t  For Meyers and Ryan th is  i s  the corn  and wheat t o t a l .  For Salathe e t  a l .  
th is  i s  t o t a l  crops and l iv e s t o c k .
2/— Lower d e f ic ie n c y  payments and low er CCC d ir e c t  c o s ts  more than o f f s e t  storage 
payments and in t e r e s t  s u b s id ie s  o f  the FOR, but la rg e r  loan  va lu es g re a t ly  
in cre a se  re co v e ra b le  c o s t .  The la t t e r  can become a fu tu re  c o s t  problem  i f  
s to ck  le v e ls  remain h igh  over sev e ra l y e a rs .
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Higher prices with the FOR increased the value of 
production and reduced crop deficiency payments 
(table 5.4). The estimated total increase in net farm 
income over the 1977-81 period was about $4 billion, 
and the estimated net savings in nonrecoverable gov­
ernment outlays was about $0.8 billion (Salathe et 
al.). Most of these impacts were in the crops sector and 
were of the same order of magnitude as the less com­
prehensive Meyers and Ryan estimates.
The recoverable costs are much higher over this 
period as a result of accumulations in reserve loans 
outstanding. These would be recovered if there were a 
reserve release and farmers redeemed the loans. If 
reserves were not released for an extended period, the 
storage and interest costs would grow and forfeiture 
to the CCC could occur. These developments all de­
pend on how acreage reduction programs are oper­
ated and how U.S. and world weather conditions 
evolve. From hindsight, we now know that good 
weather, weak acreage reduction programs, and 
these large stock accumulations led to the very costly 
PIK program in 1983.
Overall Assessment
The studies reviewed in this chapter suggest that 
during its early years the Farmer-Owned Reserve 
raised grain prices, increased farm income, reduced 
nonrecoverable government costs, and raised total 
outlays for farm programs. Most studies agree that 
the FOR reduced price variability. These studies cov­
ered a period of time when the FOR grew from noth­
ing (1977) to 1 billion bushels of wheat and 1.5 billion 
bushels of corn (end o f1982/83 marketing year). They 
omit the price-income-cost-variability effects of the 
large drawdown of FOR stocks during 1983/84. Thus, 
the research results may overstate the FOR’s impact 
on price level and farm income and understate the 
impact on price variability.
Operation of the FOR, by itself, does not neces­
sarily increase or stabilize commodity prices or farm 
income in the long run, nor does it necessarily reduce 
federal commodity program costs. The effects of the 
FOR depend on a number of factors, including the 
size of the substitution effect, the rules for stopping 
and starting storage subsidies, the level of the release 
price and loan prices, the extent to which production 
reduction program decisions are used to control size 
of the reserve and total carryover, and the extent to 
which reserve management rules are themselves sta­
ble over time.
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Part Two—
The Farmers’ Response

Chapter 6
Farmers’ Response to the Reserve Program
William H. M eyers, Robert W. Jolly, and 
M ary E. Ryan
The success of the Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) 
depends upon the reserve’s provisions to induce farm­
ers to place grain in the reserve when prices are low 
and to redeem and sell it when prices are high. Farm­
ers’ responses to the reserve’s provisions determine 
how effective the reserve is in reducing price and 
supply instability, how large the FOR stocks become, 
and, ultimately, the public cost of achieving the re­
serve’s objectives.
In this study of farm-level behavior, we identify 
how program provisions affect farmers’ grain place­
ment and redemption decisions and why response 
patterns differ among types and sizes of farmers. For 
example, the role of the storage payment and interest 
rate waivers in changing the economic incentives to 
place or remove grain from the reserve is analyzed. 
One implication of the result is that the complete 
waiver of interest costs on 1980/81 crops (legislated by 
Congress in November 1980) probably made it profit­
able enough for many producers to continue to place 
grain in the reserve even after prices exceeded re­
lease price levels. Interest waivers also contribute to 
low carrying charges for grain in release status, 
thereby reducing the incentive to quickly redeem and 
sell released grain. Eliminating the interest rate 
waiver at prices above release levels (as announced 
for the 1981 and 1982 crop years), therefore, should 
increase the rate of redemption.
Another implication of the study results concerns 
the distribution of benefits. Data examined in this 
study portray participants in the FOR as somewhat 
younger and more aggressive farm operators, with 
relatively large, well-equipped crop farms, and with 
higher debt/asset ratios than nonparticipants. The 
amount of economic incentives offered to induce par­
ticipation in the reserve may involve an important 
income transfer to farmers in general, but this may 
be distributed disproportionately to operators of 
larger, better-equipped farms, based on our examina­
tion of characteristics of participants in the FOR.1 
This should also be considered in designing the FOR 
operational procedures and in setting the level of 
incentives in the program. The higher the level of 
incentives offered to participants, the more impor­
tant the distributional and equity effects become.
For a more complete discussion of the distribution of farm pro­
gram benefits, see: William Lin, James Johnson, and Linda Calvin, 
apt?1 *-'ommodity Program s: Who Participates and Who Benefits? 
AER-474, U.S. Dept, of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
September 1981.
In this study we rely upon both economic theory 
and farm sample survey data to examine farmers’ 
response to the reserve. First, we look at the reserve 
from a firm-level perspective and draw inferences 
about farmer behavior based on economic analysis of 
the program. Then, we analyze the survey data to see 
what factors influenced farmers’ responses to reserve 
placement and redemption opportunities. When the 
sample survey was conducted, the nine included 
states accounted for 87 percent of all reserve com and 
60 percent of all reserve wheat in the United States 
(see table 6.1 for the quantity of reserve grain by 
states).
Analysis of Economic Factors
Farmers respond to the reserve with two separate 
management decisions. First, farmers must decide 
whether or not to participate in the reserve and, if 
they choose to participate, what quantity of grain to 
commit. Second, if the release price is reached, par­
ticipants must decide on a marketing strategy for 
their reserve grain. We will look at these two aspects 
separately.
The Participation Decision
Private grain storage, even when subsidized by a 
government program, is a form of investment. By 
deciding to store grain, the farmer foregoes current 
marketing alternatives in hopes of receiving a higher 
price in the future. In doing that, storage costs are 
incurred. The farmer will decide to store grain if two 
conditions are met: (1) the expected increase in reve­
nue exceeds the costs of storage and (2) the farm 
business is able to withstand the reduced cash flow 
and increased risk of storage. As with any invest­
ment, profitability, cash flow, and risk must be con­
sidered together. Not all farmers will make the same 
storage decision, even with access to the same infor­
mation, because storage costs, expectations about fu­
ture price movements, risk-bearing ability, and cash 
flow requirements will vary widely.
The reserve program does not alter the impor­
tance of these factors, but it changes the decision 
environment in several ways. Cash flow is provided 
by nonrecourse loans made to reserve participants, 
subject to constraints on when grain under loan can 
be sold. In addition, storage costs are reduced by the 
storage payment and interest rate subsidies available 
to reserve participants.2
Helpful comments were provided by Wayne Boutwell, Harlan 
Burnstein, Peter Calkins, Willard Cochrane, and Marshall 
Martin.
2Since March 1978, interest has been waived after one year on all 
reserve contracts. Interest was waived completely on all reserve 
loans for the 1980/81 crop year only.
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As with all nonrecourse loans, cash flow con­
straints resulting from storage are reduced, and the 
loan forfeiture option provides the producer with a 
risk-free, guaranteed minimum price equal to the 
loan rate.
A farmer with grain to sell has a number of op­
tions. For example, corn can be sold immediately, fed 
to livestock, stored on the farm or in the elevator, 
forward contracted, hedged, used as collateral for a 9- 
month nonrecourse loan, or placed in the reserve. 
How might a farmer compare storing grain in the
reserve with the other marketing alternatives avail­
able? To gain some insight into this decision, consider 
how a com farmer, using good management practices, 
might compare participating in the reserve program 
with a current cash sale.
If a farmer signs a reserve contract, com cannot be 
sold until market prices reach the release level. In 
return, the farmer receives a nonrecourse loan. Inter­
est may be charged on the loan, but the rate is below 
commercial rates and the period over which interest 
is charged is 1 year or less. In addition, the partici-
Table 6 .1 .  Corn and wheat, in  the g ra in  r e s e r v e , Hay 1979.
Corn Wheat
S tate Bushels in  
reserv e
State Bushels in  
reserve
Alabama 65,362 Alabama 2,700
Colorado 6 ,233 ,327 Arkansas 12,090
G eorgia 171,504 C a lifo r n ia 130,600
I l l i n o i s * 54 ,663 ,564 Colorado 22,816,878
Indiana* 22,764 ,307 G eorgia 7,028
Iowa* 172,785,592 Idaho 3,263,519
Kansas 12,817,675 I l l i n o i s * 499,084
Kentucky 500,488 Indiana* 676,876
Maryland 5,859 Iowa 151,798
M ichigan* 12,559,248 Kansas* 71,269,468
Minnesota* 143,918,065 Kentucky 4,032
M issouri 9 ,447 ,732 Maine 1,511
Nebraska* 220,619,477 Maryland 478
New Jersey 6,458 M ichigan* 775,296
New Mexico 260,274 Minnesota* 55,308,768
New York 1,133,067 M issouri 1,029,957
North C arolin a 333,961 Montana 41,507,381
North Dakota 6 ,319 ,165 Nebraska* 34,397,864
Ohio* 6 ,965 ,807 New Mexico 3,262,939
Oklahoma 170,187 New York 123,882
Pennsylvania 783,999 North Dakota* 82,512,240
South C arolina 61,025 Ohio* 488,934
South Dakota 28,639 ,441 Oklahoma 20,029,026
Tennessee 217,850 Oregon 3,234,610
Texas 6 ,057 ,976 Pennsylvania 13,777
V irg in ia 374,448 South C arolina 12,188
West V irg in ia 56,877 South Dakota 32,192,810
W isconsin 24,007 ,770 Tennessee 48,795
Wyoming 40,364 Texas 24,266,879
Utah 368,785
TOTAL 731,980 ,869 V irg in ia 18,316
Washington 11,263,978
W isconsin 202,589
Wyoming 3,276,198
TOTAL 413,171,274
Source: ASCS, USDA 
*Survey s t a te s .
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pant receives an advance storage payment at the 
beginning of each year. Storage payments are stopped 
when prices exceed the release level for a specified 
length of time. Before the 1982 crop year, when prices 
exceeded the call level (call prices were eliminated 
under the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981), the 
producer had to repay the loan plus accrued interest 
to maintain ownership of the grain. (For a description 
of these provisions, see Chapter 7.) This array of 
program stipulations affects the returns and the risk 
from reserve participation.
To compare the attractiveness of a reserve con­
tract to immediate marketing, the present value of 
the flow of costs and returns associated with the con­
tract must be calculated. The present value (PV) of 
the reserve contract is determined by three major 
components: the loan rate, the net storage payment, 
and the net final sale value of the grain. The loan rate 
is received immediately, as is the first year’s storage 
payment, but the other costs and returns incurred 
during the contract period must be discounted and 
expressed in current dollars. The three components 
are related in the following expression:
PV = Loan rate + Discounted net storage payment 
+ Discounted net final value.
The "net final value” of the contract at the time of 
redemption, assuming the loan is eventually repaid, 
is the future market price received for the grain when 
it is sold, less the amount of the loan and any accrued 
interest on the loan. Any unearned portion of the 
year’s storage payment must be refunded as well. 
These items (the loan, interest, and unearned storage 
payments) are the "contract closing costs” referred to 
later. Quality discounts, adjustments for shrinkage of 
grain, and handling charges must also be taken into 
account.
The "discounted net storage payment” is the pre­
sent value of the difference between storage pay­
ments received and storage costs incurred or consid­
ered by the producer during the life of the contract. 
The storage payment—constant for all partici­
pants—is approximately equal to commercial stor­
age costs in major grain-producing states. On-farm 
storage costs may vary widely from commercial rates. 
Direct costs, such as the extra drying and resulting 
shrinkage under long-term storage, will probably be 
higher on the farm, but other cost components will 
often be lower. If a farmer owns grain bins, ownership 
costs—depreciation, interest, repairs, taxes, and in­
surance on facilities—should be ignored in the mar­
ginal cost calculation. In some situations the farmer 
may want to include an opportunity cost on the bins, 
reflecting a rental rate or an average return earned 
from alternative storage strategies. Storage costs in­
curred by individual farmers, therefore, will differ 
substantially and could be higher or lower than the 
payment rate.
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show present values calculated 
for com and wheat in the reserve over a range of 
redemption prices and storage intervals (see box for 
equation used). We used 1980 program provisions in 
making these estimates and assumed that the grain 
is redeemed and is sold at the time of redemption.3 A 
storage loss of 3 percent due to shrinkage during the 
first year is assumed, although actual losses will vary 
substantially depending on management o f the 
stored grain. The discount rate (used by the producer 
in assessing the current value of future income) is 
assumed to be 13 percent.
The equation used in computing present values 
(PV) in tables 6.2 and 6.3 is:
PV “  PL + S  +
(1 -s ) P * -  (1 + in)PL —R - L  ,
--------------O T rt1--------------where:
C = cost of storage, grain rotation, aeration, 
fumigation, etc.
i == interest rate charged on loan per period 
L = loading costs
n = number of periods interest is charged 
PL = loan rate 
P* = sale price at redemption 
r = discount rate 
R = refund of storage subsidy 
s = percent loss due to shrinkage and quality 
deterioration 
S = storage payment 
t = period in which grain is redeemed and 
sold
The present value for com in case 1, table 6 .2 , 
when the sale price in 2 years is $2 .95 , for example, 
is computed as:
idw _  *o or , 0-97 ($2.95) -  (1.115)($2.25)
- + 0 1 3 ?--------
= $2.53
where we have assumed:
PL = $2.25 
S, = Q = 26.5# 
t = 2 
r = 0.13 
s = 0.03 
P j  = $2.95 
i = 0.115
n = 1 (since there is 1st yr. interest only)
R = L = zero
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Table 6 .2 .  Present va lu es fo r  corn  in  the reserv e  under a lte r n a t iv e  assumptions
Sales p r ic e  a t :redempt:ion  (d o l/b u )
Case and years
in stora ge 2.25 2 .50 2.81 2.95 3 .10 3.26
(D o lla rs /b u  )
Case 1 : $2.25 loan  
ra te  and 
2 6 .5C/bu 
stora g e  c o s t :—
year 1 2 / 2 / 2 .44 2 .56 2 .69 2.83
year 2 
year 3 a /  y  - / 2 .0 2 a / y—^ 2.19
2 .42
2 .40
2.53
2.49
2 .64
2 .60
2.76
2.70
Case 2 : $2.25 loan  ra te  
and 11.5C /bu . , 
s tora g e  c o s t :—
year 1 2 / 2 / 2 .59 2.71 2 .84 2.98
year 2 
year 3 a /  y—^ 2.42 a /  y—^ 2.59
2 .70
2 .80
2.81
2.89
2 .92
3 .00
3.04
3.10
Case 3: $2.40 loan  ra te  
and 11.5C /bu .
stora g e  c o s t ,
w ith  in te r e s t  3 /w aived :—
year 1 2 / 2 / 2 .84 2.95 3 .09 3.22
year 2 
year 3
2 /
2 .82
2 .94
3.03
; 3 .07  
3 .12
3 .16
3 .22
3.27
3.32
— Assumptions in c lu d e  in te r e s t  ra te  o f  11.5 p ercen t fo r  the f i r s t  year o n ly , 
d iscou n t ra te  o f  13 p e rce n t , s tora ge  lo s s  o f  3 p e rce n t , s tora ge  payment o f  26.5 
cen ts  per bushel per y ea r , and a ctu a l s tora ge  c o s t  o f  26.5 cen ts  per bu sh el.
— These a lte r n a t iv e s  are not a p p lic a b le  because corn  cannot be re le a se d  at p r ice s  
below  the re le a s e  le v e l  ($2 .81  in  1980) u n t i l  the co n tra c t  e x p ir e s .
—^ Assumptions n ot s p e c i f ie d  are the same as fo r  case 1.
— The fo r fe i t u r e  o p tio n  has a PV g rea ter  than redem ption at t h is  p r i c e .  With 
f o r f e i t u r e ,  the PV i s  equal to  the loan  ra te  p lu s  the d iscou n ted  n et storage  
payments (th ere  are no c lo s in g  c o s t s ) .
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Table 6 .3 . Present va lu es fo r  wheat in  the reserv e  under a lte r n a t iv e  assum ptions
Sales p r ic e  a t redem ption (d o l/b u )
Case and years
in  storage 3 .00 3 .60 4 .20 4.55 4 .90 5 .25
(D o l la r s /b u .)
Case 1: $3.00 loan  ra te  
and 26.5C /bu  
s tora ge  c o s t :—
year 1 2 / 2 / 3 .65 3.95 4 .25 4 .55
year 2 
year 3 4 /2770
2 /
3 .10
3 .57
3 .51
3 .84
3 .74
4 .10
3 .98
4 .37
4 .21
Case 2: $3.00 loan  ra te  
and 11 .5d /bu 3 /s tora ge  c o s t :—
year 1 2 / 2 / 3 .80 4 .10 4 .40 4 .70
year 2 
year 3 a /  y— 3 .1 0
2 /
3 .50
3.85
3 .91
4 .12
4 .14
4 .39
4 .38
4 .65
4 .61
Case 3: $3.30 loan  ra te  
and 11.5C/bu 
s tora ge  c o s t ,  
w ith  in te r e s t  
w aived :—
year 1 2 / 2 / 4 .13 4 .44 4 .74 5 .0 4
year 2 
year 3 a / yy  3 .43
2 /
3 .83
4 .19
4 .24
4.45
4 .47
4 .72
4 .71
4 .99
4 .94
— Assumptions include interest rate of 11.5 percent for the first year only, 
discount rate of 13 percent, storage loss of 3 percent, storage payments of 
26.5 cents per bushel, and actual storage costs of 26.5 cents per bushel.
— These a lte r n a t iv e s  are n ot a p p lica b le  because wheat cannot be re le a se d  a t 
p r ic e s  below  the re le a s e  p r ic e  ($4 .20  in  1980) u n t i l  the co n tr a c t  e x p ir e s .
—j Assumptions not specified are the same as for case 1.
— The fo r fe i t u r e  o p t io n  has a PV g rea ter  than redem ption a t th is  p r i c e .  With 
fo r f e i t u r e ,  the PV i s  equal to  the loan  ra te  p lu s  the d iscou n ted  n et s to ra g e  
payment (th ere  are no c lo s in g  c o s t s ) .
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In case 1, storage costs are assumed to equal the 
government storage payment. This might occur if 
grain is stored commercially or in newly constructed 
on-farm storage. If reserve corn, for example, is 
stored for 2 years and sold for $2.95 per bushel, the 
PV of the outcome will be $2.53 (table 6.2). This is 
substantially greater than the return on private 
storage.4
Suppose that at the time the farmer must make 
the participation decision, corn is selling for $2.60 
per bushel. If the farmer knew reserve corn would be 
old in 2 years for $2.95, he would choose not to partici­
pate. The PV of the contract in case 1 ($2.53) is less 
than the current price ($2.60). But this outcome ob­
viously is not guaranteed. Both the redemption price 
and storage interval are unknown when the contract 
is signed, although the release price is known. Com­
pared with a current cash sale, participation in the 
reserve is risky. Clearly, expectations of future events 
in grain markets will affect the perceived returns 
from the reserve, as will the expected response of 
government to these events through changes in pro­
gram instruments. The farmer’s ability to bear the 
risk involved in storage will also influence the deci­
sion to participate.
Case 2 (table 6 .2) represents a situation in which 
storage costs are substantially less than the storage 
payment. This would often be the case for grain 
stored on the farm. Note that PV now increases with 
the storage interval. In this situation, nearly all the 
outcomes are at least as profitable as a current sale at 
$2.60 per bushel.
Case 3 (table 6 .2) demonstrates how changes in 
program provisions may alter the decision environ­
ment of farmers. The changes in PV from case 2 to 
case 3 reflect the interest waiver and higher loan 
rates legislated by Congress in November 1980. The 
dramatic increase in profitability of a reserve con­
tract derives primarily from the interest waiver. Un­
der program provisions such as these, many farmers 
would find it profitable to enter the reserve at prices 
well above the release level of $2.82, when this is 
allowed.
Two program instruments from 1980, the release 
and call prices, do not appear explicitly in the budget­
ing procedure that we used to calculate PV. Their role 
in the decision process es rather complex. From a 
farmer’s point of view, the release and call levels 
influence expectations about returns and risk from 
participation. The expected time path of prices is the 
key factor in deciding whether to participate because 
both the redemption price and the length of storage 
influence PV. The date of sale can be nearly as impor­
tant as the price received.
Grain in the reserve cannot be sold until prices 
reach the release level or until the contract expires.
3As illustrated in tables 6.2 and 6.3, if the future sales price is too 
low, it will actually be more profitable to deliver the grain to the 
government as repayment of the loan (the forfeiture option) than to 
sell the grain and pay the closing costs.
4If corn were stored without the program benefits for 2 years with 
annual storage costs of 26.5 cents and then sold for $2.95, the 
present value would be $1.75.
Consider how an increase in the release level might 
alter a farmer’s interpretation of table 6 .2 . One factor 
is the farmer’s perception of the market impact of the 
reserve. If the farmer believes that a higher release 
level will increase total participation in the reserve 
and significantly tighten market supplies, then a 
higher price or shorter storage time for reserve grain 
may be expected. Both of these factors can increase 
the PV of the reserve contract. If the farmer does not 
expect the change to affect market behavior, then 
raising the release level might simply increase the 
expected storage time and make the contract less 
attractive.
The government’s response to market conditions 
can influence market expectations. If at the end of 
three years, prices still are less than the release level, 
the government may choose to extend reserve con­
tracts or convert to new contracts with new terms. If 
farmers expect government to behave in this way, 
then they may view the release price as a de facto 
support price for participants, and prices below the 
release price will be considered unlikely.5
The effect on participation of changes in the call 
price under previous legislation also is somewhat 
ambiguous. In the past, the farmer was required to 
repay the loan but not actually to sell the grain when 
it was "called.” Calling the loan by the secretary of 
agriculture was not mandatory, however. Whether or 
not farmers interpret either the release or call level 
as a ceiling price depends on their individual expecta­
tions, cash flow requirements, and reserve invento­
ries. Some farmers need to sell all or part of their 
reserve grain as soon as they are allowed in order to 
repay loans and other costs. For them a call level is 
tantamount to a ceiling price. For farmers with lower 
cash requirements, a call level defines the point at 
which total costs of grain storage are reassumed by 
them. For these farmers, a call level approximates a 
ceiling price only if they expect that the reserve pro­
gram will effectively restrict price movements above 
that level. This expectation will be greatly influenced 
by their past experience.
With identical expectations of the future, farmers 
can make different FOR participation decisions be­
cause of differences in storage costs, risk-bearing 
ability, and cash flow requirements.6 There are other 
differences among farms that can influence par­
ticipation. Among the more important are the alter­
native grain marketing conditions and participation 
in other government programs.
Expectations also will vary among farmers. Indi­
vidual farmers will differ in their interpretation of 
market information, and some will have access to 
information not available to others. These factors are 
important, particularly as they relate to the price 
sensitivity of reserve participation. Some of these 
effects are quite evident in the survey results pre­
sented later in this article.
5Farmers are likely to take this view now, since contract conver­
sions have often been permitted after the release price was 
reached.
The cash flow for participants is the sum of the loan and 1 years 
storage payment ($2.515 in cases 1 and 2, $2.665 in case 3). For 
nonparticipants, the cash flow is the current market price.
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The Redemption Decision
Once the release level is reached, the reserve par­
ticipant must formulate a marketing plan. The 
farmer can sell the crop immediately or continue to 
store it. The release decision is a grain storage prob­
lem with the same intertemporal dimensions just 
discussed for the participation decision. The farmer 
will continue to store grain after release if the ex­
pected price increase exceeds storage costs, provided 
that the cash flow and risk situation is satisfactory. 
One way to make this decision is to compute the 
marginal carrying cost for reserve grain and compare 
it with the expected price change. The following il­
lustration for farm-stored com uses the 1978/79 crop 
year program provisions.
Suppose the storage payments have been sus­
pended and the farmer can sell the reserve com at 
$3.00 per bushel. Suppose also that the farmer has 
already invested the original loan and this year’s 
storage subsidy. If the contract is more than 1 year old 
or has a total interest waiver, the marginal interest 
cost on the loan is zero. Were the grain sold at $3, the 
loan, accrued interest, and any unearned storage 
would have to be repaid. These three items make up 
the contract’s closing costs. Selling would add capital 
to the business equal to the difference between the 
sale price and the contract’s closing costs. Interest 
charged on this difference is the major component in 
the carrying cost for continuing to store grain on- 
farm.7 In other words, a farmer who continues to store 
reserve com will forego immediate receipt of this
7Some allowance could be made for additional shrinkage or deteri­
oration losses. These are minor factors and are omitted to simplify 
the discussion.
difference and will incur additional storage costs 
(carrying costs) equal to an interest charge—an op­
portunity cost—on the difference. If the expected fu­
ture price increase is greater than the carrying cost, 
expected profit from continuing to store is positive. In 
most cases this additional cost is rather small.
To illustrate the magnitudes involved, we calcu­
lated closing costs for two common reserve contracts 
for com (table 6.4). In computing the unearned stor­
age refund (to the government), we assumed a Janu­
ary contract date in both cases. Storage payments for 
both contracts ceased on August 31, 1980. Closing 
costs after this date remained constant. In the 1978 
crop contract, the loan was $2 and interest was 
charged at 7 percent for 12 months. For 1979 com 
signed after the embargo, the loan was $2.10 and the 
interest was waived.
Carrying costs for 3 months and 8 months are 
presented in table 6.5 for com stored under the 1978 
and post-embargo 1979 contracts.8 Even without stor­
age payments, the carrying costs are very low. A 
farmer with a current sales opportunity at $3 per 
bushel needs only an 8-cent price increase to cover 
storage costs for 8 months. The size of the loan rela-
8Marginal carrying costs (MC) were estimated by using the 
equation:
MC =' [PC -  (1 + in)PL -  R -  TCS] x r* + CR 
where:
PC = current sales price
TCS = accumulated storage charges (TCS = 0 if stored on the 
farm)
CR = marginal commercial storage rate (CR = 0 if stored on the 
farm)
r* = effective interest rate or cost of capital 
PL, R, i, and n are defined in the box on page 275.
(1 + in)PL + R = contract closing costs shown in table 6.4
Table 6 .4 . C losin g  c o s ts  on two common corn  reserv e  co n tra c ts
Cost component C losin g  c o s t
(D o lla rs /b u )
1978 crop  (Reserve I ) : —^
Loan ra te 2 .0 0
In te re s t .14
Unearned s tora ge .09
T ota l 2 .23
1979 crop  (Reserve I I ) : —^
Loan ra te 2 .1 0
In te re s t 0
Unearned s tora ge .09
T ota l 2 .19
-  Grain p la ced  in  the reserv e  b e fo re  January 7 , 1980 (th e tim e o f  the suspension  
o f  gra in  exp orts  to  the S ov ie t  Union) has been la b e le d  "R eserve I "  g ra in .
Grain p la ced  in  the reserv e  from January 8 through August 24, 1980, has been 
la b e led  "R eserve I I "  g ra in . Major changes in  the reserv e  p r o v is io n s  occu rred  
at these tim es (see  Chapter 7 by B urnstein  and L a n g ley ).
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tive to current sales price and the limitation on loan 
interest to 1 year or less are the major program in­
struments that keep these costs so low.
The use of commercial storage increases these 
carrying charges substantially. As an example, the 
marginal commercial storage rate for corn in Iowa 
was about 2 cents/bushel/month in 1979. Adding this 
to the figures in table 6.5 approximately triples the 
charges for carrying grain in release status.
Program provisions also influence carrying 
charges. A wider (smaller) band between the loan 
rate and release level increases (decreases) the dif­
ference between sale price and closing costs and 
thereby raises (reduces) the carrying charges. Carry­
ing charges for wheat, therefore, tend to be higher 
than those for feed grains because the band for wheat 
is wider. The higher loan rates passed by Congress in 
November 1980 did not affect release levels, so that 
change reduced carrying charges.
The effect of rescinding the interest waiver when 
grain is in release status can be computed by adding 
the marginal interest cost to the carrying costs. In 
the examples in table 6.5, an interest charge would 
increase the monthly carrying costs by nearly two 
cents per bushel.
This is the profitability dimension of the decision. 
Cash flow, risk bearing ability, and bin space con­
straints also may enter into the decision. Redeeming 
the reserve com for $3 will increase cash flow imme­
diately. If cash flow requirements are high or if oper­
ating capital is in short supply, the potential profit 
from storage may have to be foregone. As with par­
ticipation, differences in farm characteristics, loca­
tion, and expectations also will contribute to a 
diversity of responses to redemption opportunities. 
The survey data presented in the next section provide 
some evidence of these effects.
Analysis of Farm Survey
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the 
program provisions will elicit different responses 
from individual farmers. The farm survey data were 
analyzed to determine what factors were most impor­
tant in participation decisions and the differing lev­
els of redemption among farmers.
A Survey of Farmers’ Responses to the FOR
A sample survey of com and wheat farms was 
conducted in the summer of 1979 to find out the 
characteristics of participants and nonparticipants 
in the FOR, to determine reasons for different re­
sponses to the FOR, and to help identify any prob­
lems with the program. Samples were selected within 
each of nine north central states (see box), and infor­
mation was obtained from a mailed questionnaire, 
telephone interviews, and ASCS county offices. Both 
participants and nonparticipants were surveyed in 
each state, except in the four soft winter wheat states, 
where only nonparticipants were surveyed because so 
few farmers had participated in the reserve in these 
states.
For more detail on survey procedures and state 
results, see "The Farmer-Owned Grain Reserve Pro­
gram: A Survey of Farmers’ Responses and Opinions” 
(Ryan and Meyers, 1981). The survey was part of the 
North Central Regional Research Project NC-152 
(Economic Consequences of the Selected Provisions of 
the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977) and was con­
ducted in cooperation with agricultural experiment 
stations in each survey state and the U.S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture.
When the survey was conducted (summer 1979), 
the wheat reserve had been in operation for 2 years
Table 6 .5 .  Carrying c o s ts  on fa rm -stored  reserv e  corn  in  re le a s e  sta tu s  under 
two common co n tr a c ts  (1978 crop  and 1979 crop ) —
________________ Storage p e r io d __________
3 months 8 months
Current s a le s  p r ic e  1978 1979 1978 1979
d o l la r s /b u  (C ents/bu )
2 .80 2 .1 2 .3 5 .7 6 .1
3 .00 2 .9 3 .0 7 .7 8 .1
3 .20 3 .6 3 .8 9 .7 10 .1
—^  Assuming the c o s t  o f  c a p ita l  equals 15 p ercen t per y e a r ; c lo s in g  c o s ts from
ta b le  6 .4 .
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Numbers of farmers sampled in NC-152 farm 
survey.
Corn
East:
farmers sampled
Illinois 630
Indiana 500
Michigan 266
Ohio 418
West:
Iowa 875
Minnesota 320
Nebraska 225
Wheat 
Hard spring:
farmers sampled
Minnesota 703
North Dakota 715
Hard winter:
Kansas 1,873
Nebraska 572
Soft winter:
Illinois 431
Indiana 540
Michigan 353
Ohio 573
and the com reserve for about 1-1/2 years. All farm­
ers had been eligible to place wheat and corn from the 
1976 and 1977 crops in the reserve, and set-aside 
participants were eligible to place 1978 crop wheat 
and com.
Some 1978 corn was placed in the reserve early in 
the year when direct entry was permitted9, but 1978 
wheat did not enter the reserve until after the survey 
period. Both the wheat and corn reserves had reached 
target levels and were closed to new placements for 3 
to 4 months preceding the survey. They were both in 
release status when the survey was conducted.
Because the data revealed regional differences in 
response, we analyzed the survey data by regions. 
The four eastern Com Belt states surveyed (Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio) account for about 37 per­
cent of U.S. corn production, but in February 1979, 
they held only 13 percent of grain reserve stocks of 
com. In contrast, the three western states surveyed 
(Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska) produced about the 
same share of the nation’s corn but held 73 percent of 
its reserve. Differences also existed among wheat
One provision of the reserve program was that grain would enter 
only after the maturity of a 9-month loan contract. Occasionally an 
exception was made and "direct entry” was permitted to accelerate 
placements. From October 1979 until the 1984/85 crop year, direct 
entry has been allowed except when the reserve was in call status.
states. About 40 percent of U.S. wheat is grown by the 
hard-wheat states surveyed (Minnesota, North Da­
kota, Kansas, Nebraska), and 10 percent comes from 
the four soft red winter wheat states surveyed (Illi­
nois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio). Their shares in the 
national wheat reserve were about 58 percent and 6 
percent, respectively.
Participation Response
Among the farmers surveyed, participation rates 
in the reserve program ranged from negligible for 
soft winter wheat (not reported) to 21 percent for 
spring wheat (table 6 .6). Farmers who placed grain in 
the reserve had large cash grain operations, with 40 
to 74 percent more cropland and 77 to 112 percent 
more wheat or com acreage, on average, than nonpar­
ticipants. Nonparticipants included ineligible pro­
ducers as well as those who were eligible to enter the 
reserve program but chose not to do so. Wheat or com 
was the major 1978 crop of participants and nonpar­
ticipants, except in Minnesota and Nebraska. There, 
nonparticipating wheat farmers had more feed grain 
than wheat acreage. Although the soft winter wheat 
survey had too few participants for comparisons to be 
made, characteristics of the nonparticipants were 
very similar to those of nonparticipating com farm­
ers in the same eastern Com Belt states.
The proportions of participants and nonpartici­
pants who raised livestock were similar, but, for non­
participating corn farmers, livestock (including 
dairy) was a more important source of 1978 income 
than grains. This was more evident in the western 
Corn Belt than in the east. Nonparticipants in both 
com regions also committed more of their 1978 crop 
to livestock feeding.
Grain reserve participants tended to be younger, 
with higher debt/asset ratios than nonparticipants. 
Full owners were less likely to be in the program than 
part owners. Although participation in other govern­
ment programs was significantly less for com non­
participants, more than three-fourths of nonpar­
ticipating wheat growers took part in the 1978 set- 
aside program. Thus, unwillingness to participate in 
any government program was not characteristic of 
nonparticipating wheat growers nor of a substantial 
share of nonparticipants in the western Com Belt.
Grain storage was a major enterprise of partici­
pants. Except in the eastern Corn Belt, participants 
had a much larger storage capacity per cropland acre 
than nonparticipants. Part of this difference was the 
result of facilities added in 1977 and 1978 by about 60 
percent of participating corn farmers, 70 percent of 
participating hard spring wheat farmers, and 41 per­
cent of participating hard winter wheat farmers. The 
percentages for nonparticipants were about half as 
large. Participants, especially corn producers, were 
better equipped for grain drying. All this implies that 
the cost of storage to participants may be consider­
ably below commercial storage rates.
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Table 6 . 6 . C h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  farm s, s tora g e  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and stora g e  le v e ls  fo r  
p a r t ic ip a n ts  (P) and n on p a rtic ip a n ts  (NP), by reg ion
Corn___________  ______ Hard wheat
Mean le v e ls Unit East West Spring____ Winter
P NP P NP P NP P NP
Percent o f  sample Percent 2 98 16 84 21 79 9 91
Farmers in terv iew ed Number 37 743 227 333 294 480 224 525
Cropland A cres 546 314 509 300 931 667 850 598
Corn or wheat area Acres 324 153 259 136 364 206 298 158
Major e n te r p r is e , 1978—^
Grains P ercent 32 30 33 21 44 49 49 52
L iv estock P ercent 19 35 32 50 21 21 29 29
Percent o f  1978 crop  fe d  P ercent 16 28 19 4 2 / 2 / 2/ 2 /
D eb t/a sse t r a t io Percent 23 12 23 16 25 20 24 19
Age Years 50 54 48 51 49 52 50 53
Tenancy
F u ll owner Percent 26 41 36 50 33 44 16 26
Own p a r t -r e n t  p art Percent 65 45 53 38 61 45 74 57
1978 s e t -a s id e  p a r t i c i -
pant Percent 69 28 81 48 89 76 96 79
Storage f a c i l i t i e s
C a p a city /crop  acre Bu 68 62 88 52 50 30 56 31
Added some 1977-78 P ercent 63 24 59 24 70 34 41 22
Have drying  equ ip . P ercent 80 59 80 47 33 19 32 25
T ota l s to re d  (re se rv e  p lu s
n on reserve) 1 ,0 0 0  bu 9 .5 2 .8 17.1 3 .3 11.5 1.9 11.5 0 .4
Percent o f  1978 p r o -
d u ction Percent 26 17 57 23 93 30 117 9
Reserve q u an tity  s to re d 1 ,0 0 0  bu 5 .1 0 1 1 .2 0 7 .7 0 7 .0 0
Percent o f  1978 p r o -
d u ction Percent 14 0 38 0 63 0 71 0
^  Percent o f  farms fo r  which g r a in s / l iv e s t o c k  i s  the m ajor e n te r p r is e . 
— Not a v a ila b le  fo r  wheat.
282
Table 6 .7 . Importance o f  fa c to r s  in  d ecid in g  whether to  p a r t ic ip a t e  in  the 
reserv e  program, by reg ion —
Corn Hard wheat
Mean le v e ls East West Spring W inter
P NP P NP P NP P NP
(P ercen t)
Expect h igher fu tu re  p r ic e s :
L i t t l e  im portance 4 15 2 12 2 8 2 8
Important 24 44 27 51 26 41 14 45
Extreme im portance 72 41 71 37 72 51 84 47
Current market p r i c e :
L i t t le  im portance 10 10 8 20 5 14 5 8
Important 17 52 26 59 30 51 24 55
Extreme im portance 37 30 66 21 65 35 71 37
Expect h igher re le a s e  p r ic e :
L i t t le  im portance 42 42 36 34 29 24 24 29
Important 27 42 40 48 47 49 34 46
Extreme im portance 31 16 24 18 24 27 42 25
A v a i la b i l i t y  o f  s to ra g e :
L i t t le  im portance 48 27 32 22 26 19 49 29
Important 27 48 39 50 50 58 32 51
Extreme im portance 15 25 29 28 24 23 19 20
P oss ib le  g ra in  s p o ila g e :
L i t t le  im portance 60 31 44 27 35 24 58 28
Important 20 39 29 41 36 51 20 42
Extreme im portance 20 30 27 32 29 35 22 30
S et-a s id e  requirem ent:
L i t t l e  im portance 43 22 42 33 35 20 40 27
Important 30 51 44 43 41 49 34 51
Extreme im portance 27 27 14 24 24 31 26 22
-  Responses were " l i t t l e  im p ortan ce ," " im p orta n t,"  "extrem e im p orta n ce ," or  "no 
o p in io n ."  Those w ith  no op in ion  were excluded from the percen tages rep orted  
h e re .
N °te : See box in  te x t  fo r  s ta te s  in  each re g io n .
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In all areas, the quantity of grain stored by par­
ticipants far exceeded that of nonparticipants. This is 
explained in part by the larger average acreage and 
production of participants, but even as a percentage 
of 1978 production, participants put two to three 
times more grain in storage than nonparticipants. 
Corn reserve participants carried a slightly lower 
level of free (nonreserve) stocks than nonpartici­
pants, relative to production. For wheat, the propor­
tion of production stored outside the reserve by 
nonparticipants was the same as or greater than that 
for participants. The extent to which new facilities 
were added, and the evidence that free-stock holding 
by participants is not much less than that of nonpar­
ticipants, suggests that reserve participants may not 
view reserve grain as a good substitute for normal 
inventory activities. To the extent that participating 
farmers maintain their normal free-stock levels, the 
effectiveness of the reserve program in increasing 
total stocks is enhanced. This is an important issue 
and needs to be explored further.
Respondents were asked to rank the importance 
of various factors in their decision to participate or 
not. Compared with nonparticipants, participants 
placed much greater importance on current and ex­
pected future cash prices, somewhat greater impor­
tance on expected higher release prices, and much 
less importance on storage constraints and set-aside 
requirements (table 6.7). Nonparticipants frequently 
chose the middle ground ("important”), and many 
expressed no opinion.
The data portray participants as aggressive farm 
operators, with large, well-equipped farms rather 
specialized in crop production, and using the reserve 
and other government programs for risk manage­
ment and income support. These findings are consis­
tent with our earlier theoretical analysis of the 
participation decisions. In terms of profitability fac­
tors, the nonparticipants were less well equipped to 
handle storage themselves and were more dependent 
on more costly commercial storage. Differing charac­
teristics frequently reflect differences in risk-bear­
ing ability. For com, a smaller farm with a more 
important livestock enterprise may be less exposed to 
risk in crop operations or may have higher valued 
alternative uses for grain. The size of the livestock 
operation relative to grain production also may con­
strain the quantity available for long-term storage. 
In the hard spring wheat and soft winter wheat areas, 
wheat acreage of nonparticipants was less than feed 
grain acreage, implying less risk exposure in the 
wheat enterprise than those with greater reliance on 
wheat production.
The survey data shed little light on reasons for the 
much higher participation rates in the western Corn 
Belt and hard spring wheat regions than in the other 
two regions. Participants’ characteristics and opin­
ions are remarkably uniform from one state to an­
other. That pattern suggests that more of the farm 
and farmer types likely to participate are in the west­
ern Corn Belt and in the spring hard wheat states. 
Market conditions may be an important factor in
Table 6 . 8 . Redemption responses and in flu e n c in g fa c t o r s ,  by s ta te
Farmers who
redeemed
some
Share o f  
t o t a l
placem ents
redeemed
(%)
Farmers using 
commercial 
stora ge  
(%)
Main reason 
fo r  redemption
Need
P rice  cash
(N o.) (%) (%) (%)
Eastern Corn 
Indiana
B e lt :—/
10 83 56 42 57 22
I l l i n o i s 9 75 71 42 25 67
W estern Corn 
Iowa
B e lt :
43 40 25 15 49 13
Nebraska 14 33 20 26 46 27
M innesota 7 14 12 6 27 27
Hard w in ter 1 
Kansas
wheat :
117 74 59 73 13 70
Nebraska 33 58 41 44 21 68
Hard sp rin g  wheat: 
North Dakota 53 41 22 8 39 16
M innesota 42 34 20 6 31 40
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regional differences. The wider participation in the 
western Com Belt is accentuated in periods of price 
weakness, which would contribute to greater par­
ticipation. Also the unusually strong prices for soft 
wheat during 1978/79 deterred participation among 
eastern Com Belt wheat growers.
Redemption Response of Participants
Wheat in the reserve was released in May 1979, 
and storage payments were suspended on June 30. 
Com was released from June 19 to August 1,1979, so 
storage payments were not suspended. Thirty-eight 
percent of wheat reserves and 25 percent of com 
reserves were released by the end of September. For­
tunately, it was during this release period that farm­
ers were surveyed on redemption behavior.
The percentage of com farmers who had redeemed 
some grain at the time of the survey ranged from 83 
in Indiana to 14 in Minnesota (table 6 .8). The per­
centage of reserve grain that was redeemed also var­
ied greatly, from 71 percent for Illinois com to 12 
percent for Minnesota com. In the western Com Belt 
and spring wheat states, fewer farmers relied on com­
mercial storage, so lower carrying costs partly ex­
plain the lower redemption rates. Most farmers gave 
either price or cash flow requirements as the main 
reason for redeeming their grain. The need for cash 
was notable in Illinois and the hard winter wheat 
states, where redemption rates were high.
All grain reserve participants were asked to rank 
the importance of five nonprice factors in their deci­
sions to sell or hold grain in release status. The re­
moval of storage payments was the major factor in the 
western Corn Belt and hard winter wheat areas, 
while the availability of storage space was considered 
most important in the other two regions (table 6 .9). 
When farmers volunteered other factors important to 
their decision, price was by far the dominant choice, 
except in the eastern Com Belt. There cash need was 
mentioned slightly more than price.
To examine further farmers’ responses to redemp­
tion incentives, we classified participants as sellers 
(redeemed all their grain), partial sellers (redeemed 
some of their grain), and holders (redeemed no grain; 
see table 6 .10). Somewhat surprisingly, sellers and 
holders in Iowa (com) and hard spring wheat states 
were similar, while partial sellers differed. In these 
states, partial sellers had larger farms and planted 
more com or spring wheat in 1978 than did sellers or 
holders. Partial sellers’ 1978 farm sales reflected
Table 6 .9 . Rank o f  fa c to r s  th at in flu e n ce  the d e c is io n  to  s e l l  or  h o ld  g ra in  in  
re le a s e  s ta tu s—
Factor Corn Hard wheat
East West Spring W inter
Rank % —^ Rank % —^ Rank % ¿ / Rank % —^
Storage payments stopp ing 2 ( -9 ) 1 ( 26) 2 ( 9) 1 ( 16)
Storage space 1 ( 2 ) 2 ( 16) 1 ( 23) 2 ( -  5)
Time o f  year 3 (-10 ) 3 ( -  7) 4 ( -  6 ) 4 (-1 5 )
Tax s itu a t io n 5 (-3 9 ) 4 (-1 9 ) 3 ( -  5) 3 (-1 0 )
S ize o f  CCC stock s 4 (-3 8 ) 5 (-2 3 ) 5 (-1 6 ) 5 (-3 1 )
Other fa c to r s  vo lu n teered  
by respondents:
(P ercen t)
P rice 39 64 65 65
T ran sporta tion 8 10 14 2
Cash needs 41 5 3 14
-  The p ercen tages in  parentheses are the d i f fe r e n c e s  between the percen tage  
answering "v ery  im portant" and the percen tage answering "n ot im p orta n t"; e .g .  in  
the case o f  corn  farm ers in  the W est, the p ro p o rt io n  in d ic a t in g  th a t stopping* 
payments was a "v ery  im portant" fa c t o r  was 26 percen tage p o in ts  more than the 
p rop ortion  in d ic a t in g  th at th is  fa c to r  was "n ot im p orta n t."
greater dependence on cash grain. Sellers and hold­
ers depended more on livestock earnings. The partial 
sellers in Iowa and the hard spring wheat states were 
farmers with large cash grain operations. Their re­
demption behavior suggested use of the grain reserve 
as a tool in their marketing strategies.
In Iowa, holders had the smallest average amount 
of cropland farmed and had the lowest debt/asset 
ratio, but there were many more farmers in this cate­
gory than in the other two combined. Having a larger 
equity, they were perhaps better able to hold their 
corn for later use. They also had more free corn 
stored, allowing market options without redeeming 
grain-reserve corn.
In all three crop groups, sellers had the least com 
or wheat acreage, and they were the least dependent 
on cash grain for income. Sellers in both wheat 
groups had the highest debt/asset ratios. In the hard 
winter wheat group, there was little difference in 
other respects among characteristics of sellers, par­
tial sellers, and holders. The higher redemption rate 
in this region may have obscured differences that 
occurred early in the release period.
Our earlier theoretical analysis of the redemption 
decision indicated that differing rates of redemption 
can be rationalized by differing storage costs, liqui­
dity constraints on cash or grain, expectations, and 
risk factors. The survey demonstrated the role of costs 
and liquidity in the redemption process. As with par­
ticipation, there is evidence that those more exposed 
to grain market risk because of a large cash grain 
enterprise are using the reserve as a risk manage­
ment tool. Expectations are not well reflected in the 
survey data, but current local market conditions 
clearly were influencing decisions.
Policy Implications
m
Economic factors make the reserve program more 
attractive to some farmers than to others. To the 
extent that market prices are increased (decreased) 
by the reserve, all farmers gain (lose), but reserve 
participants benefit further by their ability to carry 
grain from a period of surplus to one of deficit at little 
cost. Our analysis shows that returns to storage are 
substantially increased by the reserve program. The 
distribution of these benefits favors the larger cash 
grain farmers who are the major program partici­
pants. In this respect, the reserve resembles other 
government programs that provide benefits propor­
tional to size or production. It may be more efficient 9 
for the reserve grain to be carried by 100,000 large 
farms than by 300,000 small farms, but problems of 
equity arise if the benefits of participation far exceed 
the costs incurred. Policymakers need to be cognizant 
of this in determining program provisions.
If the reserve program is to be used primarily to 
stabilize price and supply, the program provisions 
should be designed to assure adequate placements 
during surplus periods and an adequate rate of re­
demptions during shortage periods. Provisions that 
are too attractive provide windfall gains to partici­
pants, an excessive demand for reserve contracts in 
surplus periods, and a slow rate of redemption during J
shortage periods. As an example, the interest waiver 
passed by Congress in 1980 (and repealed in July 
1981) made placements an attractive option to farm­
ers with on-farm storage even after market prices 
went well above the release level (see case 3, table » 
6.1). This action is difficult to justify in terms of 
stabilization objectives.
Our analysis of the redemption process indicates 
that a waiver of second- and third-year interest on v
Table 6.10. Comparison of farm and farmer characteristics for those who redeemed all (sellers), some (partial 
sellers), and none (holders) of their reserve grain in release status—
Com Hard wheat
Iowa Spring Winter «1
Characteristic Unit
Sellers
Partial
sellers Holders Sellers
Partial
sellers Holders Sellers
Partial
sellers Holders.
Sample Number 25 15 63 22 16 121 100 22 64
$
Cropland area Acres 459 739 433 827 1276 900 867 922 842 Bf
Com or wheat area Acres 202 430 225 247 530 351 221 297 360
Average yield 
Major enterprise:
Bu/acre 119 123 118 31 41 33 32 35 34 *
Grains Percent 4 33 13 28 58 44 45 56 51
Livestock Percent 
Percent of '78 crop
28 13 40 20 7 20 29 27 27 9f
fed Percent 21 15 25 2/ 2/ 2/ 2/ 2/ 2/
Debt/asset ratio 
Tenancy:
Percent 23 33 20 29 20 23 29 18 25 >
Full owners Percent 19 13 43 30 24 36 15 13 19
Part owners Percent 54 73 47 64 73 58 77 76 71 »
Storage capacity 
Total stocks/'78
Bu/acre 68 82 92 53 48 50 78 51 59
9
production Percent 29 45 70 53 38 38 106 126 140
a
•I' Among corn states, only Iowa had enough responses to subdivide. Box in text shows states in each region.
W  Not available for wheat. m
*
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reserve loans contributes substantially to a low car­
rying charge on grain if the waiver continues to apply 
in release status. In this case, the interest waiver 
tends to retard redemptions and increase the amount 
of reserve grain carried into call status. If a more 
rapid flow of sales from the reserve is desirable dur­
ing release status, it can be encouraged by removing 
interest waivers when price exceeds the release trig­
ger. The interest charge, essentially, would place 
farmers back into a private storage decision 
framework.
The cost of the reserve program and the distribu­
tion of program benefits are important concerns. 
Both concerns can be addressed if reserve program 
provisions are sufficiently attractive to assure ade­
quate participation but not so attractive as to provide 
excessive benefits to participants. This approach re­
quires the secretary of agriculture to retain discre­
tionary authority over interest charges as well as 
other program provisions. Although frequent 
changes in the provisions add complexity and uncer­
tainty to the program, too much rigidity can threaten 
its viability.
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Chapter 7
A Description of U.S. Grain Reserve Programs
Harlan Burnstein and James Langley
Introduction
The accumulation and dispersal of commodity 
stocks has been an integral part of U.S. agricultural 
programs since their inception in the thirties. U.S. 
stock management programs include the Farmer- 
Owned Reserve (FOR), nonrecourse loans, Com­
modity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks, the Farm 
Facility Loain Program, and the Food Security Wheat 
Reserve. This chapter provides a detailed description 
of the objectives and operation of, and the interre­
lationship between, these stock management pro­
grams, with emphasis on the Farmer-Owned Re­
serve, nonrecourse loans, and CCC purchases. An 
evaluation of how these programs have fulfilled their 
objectives is left to other papers in this publication.
Nonrecourse loans provide a means to help farm­
ers spread out their grain marketing over a crop year 
and provide a price floor to eligible program partici­
pants. Grain is used as collateral for these loans. Over 
the course of the loan period, the loan may be repaid 
by the farmer. At the end of the loan period for wheat 
and feed grains, the commodities can be entered into 
the FOR, if permissible, or forfeited to CCC. Entry 
into the FOR has often been allowed before expiration 
of the loan period. CCC-owned stocks are primarily a 
result of price and income support activities, but they 
also add to short-term stability objectives. Under 
current law, CCC-owned stocks can only be released 
on the domestic market at prices above an estab­
lished percentage of the FOR release price.
The FOR was initially authorized by the Agri­
culture and Food Act of 1977. One policy objective of 
the FOR was the reduction of market price vari­
ability, although enhancement of producer prices and 
income was also an important consideration. The 
FOR program helps to achieve these objectives by 
providing economic incentives to grain producers to 
store grain for 3 to 5 years. These incentives include 
storage payments that cover a substantial portion of 
the storage cost, 3- to 5-year commodity loans that 
provide for immediate cash flow to participating pro­
ducers, waiver of interest payments during the sec­
ond and third years, below-market rates of interest, 
and, in some years, a higher loan rate for FOR loans 
than for regular loans. Both the FOR and the 9- 
month loan program are administered by the USDA’s 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service 
(ASCS) and are financed by the CCC.
In this chapter, stocks and loans associated with 
the FOR are referred to as FOR stocks and FOR
loans, as opposed to other stocks and loans of the 
CCC, which are referred to as CCC-owned stocks (or 
purchases) and regular nonrecourse loans. The basic 
market effects of CCC or FOR operations can be sim­
ilar. Government-controlled grain stocks increase as 
prices drop below the nonrecourse loan rate, and they 
decrease as prices rise above the domestic release 
price. The increase in government-controlled stocks 
limits the price drop, and the release of accumulated 
stocks limits the price rise. These effects help to re­
duce overall price variability.
Complementing these reserve management pro­
grams is the Farm Facility Loan program, also ad­
ministered by ASCS. Farm facility loans have been 
used in the past to subsidize producers’ purchases of 
farm storage facilities and drying equipment so as to 
increase storage capacity and reduce storage costs.
Foreign countries have benefitted from U.S. stock 
policies, both from their price support and stabiliza­
tion effects and as a source for international food aid. 
The Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980 autho­
rized the establishment of a reserve of up to 4 million 
metric tons of wheat (about 147 million bushels) 
solely for emergency humanitarian food needs in de­
veloping countries. Wheat stocks acquired for this 
reserve may be released by the President to provide, 
by donation or sale, emergency food assistance to 
developing countries at any time that the U.S. domes­
tic supply of wheat is so limited that it cannot be 
made available for distribution under P.L. 480. Al­
though specifically designed for food aid, the wheat 
reserve also effectively isolates a small proportion of 
government-owned stocks from the market, thus 
tending to support domestic prices to some extent.
The effects on market price and price variability 
of these programs depend on many factors, including 
the value of incentives offered to regular loan and 
reserve participants, producer expectations of mar­
ket prices, storage capacity, and the number of pro­
ducers eligible to participate in the regular loan and 
reserve programs. Some of these factors are influ­
enced by a number of program implementation deci­
sions regarding the loan rate levels, interest rates, 
direct storage payment rates, maximum size of the 
reserve, conditions for release of reserve grain, and 
set-aside or acreage reduction requirements. In gen­
eral, however, the effects of the reserve program can 
be described in terms of its expected impact on price 
movements over time, in relation to the program 
price parameters, as shown in figure 7 .1.
The authors wish to thank, without implications, Jim Zellner, 
Keith Collins, Orville Overboe, Randy Weber, and LeRoy Rude for 
helpful comments and suggestions.
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The price parameters of the nonrecourse loan (or 
CCC purchase) and sales program define a price cor­
ridor between the regular loan rate and the mini­
mum CCC sales price. The FOR price parameters— 
the reserve loan rate and the reserve trigger release 
price—define a narrower price corridor nestled 
within the larger one. Except for 1980, 1981, and 
1982, the CCC loan rate and the reserve loan rate 
have been equal, so that the regular loan rate defines 
the lower bound of both price corridors. Without ei­
ther the regular loan or FOR programs, prices would 
be free to vary both above and below the outer limits 
of these price bands. With the programs in operation, 
the FOR moderates the degree of price variability by 
providing an incentive for farmers to accumulate 
grain when prices fall below the reserve loan rate and 
by changing the incentives so that grain will be re­
leased when prices rise above the release price. If 
FOR incentives and stock changes are not sufficient 
to keep prices within the FOR band, then CCC-owned 
stocks may vary enough to keep prices within the 
CCC price band. The success of the regular loan and 
FOR programs in keeping market prices for grains 
within the defined price corridors is discussed else­
where in this report.
Additional details about the programs that make 
up the basis for implementation of U.S. grain reserve 
policies are presented and discussed in this chapter. 
Topics include nonrecourse loans, CCC purchase and 
sales programs, the reserve contract, eligibility con­
ditions for producer participation, and other admin­
istrative details such as determination of when the 
reserve is "open” or in "release status,” definition of 
national average prices, and inspection and grain 
quality control. The chapter finishes with an over­
view of the Facility Loan Program.
The current FOR program was mandated by the 
Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 and reauthorized 
by the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981. The basic 
provisions for the programs are the same in both acts. 
Unless otherwise stated, the following discussion re­
fers to the law and provisions based on the 1981 act, 
which covers the 1982-85 crop years.
CCC Loan, Purchase, and Sales Program
CCC acquires stocks as a direct consequence of its 
price support activities, either through producer de­
fault on nonrecourse loans or by direct purchases of 
program commodities. Nonrecourse loans and pur­
chase programs have been available to producers 
since the thirties and are currently provided for 
wheat, com, sorghum, barley, oats, rye, upland cot­
ton, extra long staple cotton, rice, soybeans, sugar, 
tobacco, peanuts, honey, and dairy products, under 
authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation 
Charter Act of 1933, as amended, and by subsequent 
legislation.
In terms of volume of activity, wheat, feed grains, 
cotton, and rice predominate (figures 7.2-7.5). Pro­
ducers may obtain a nonrecourse loan from CCC by
m
*
1
4
#
4
Price
(dollars per bushel)
CCC price 
corridor
FOR price 
corridor
Time
‘ Legislated m inim um .
“ FOR loan rate above regular loan rate only during 1980-82, otherw ise the  tw o  loan rates have been equal.
Figure 7.1. Price corridors under U.S. grain reserve programs.
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, U.S. ENDING STOCKS OF WHEAT U.S ENDING STOCKS OF COTTON
1
CCC—OWNED CCC—OWNED
Figure 7.2. Wheat: U.S. ending stocks, 1950-1984. Figure 7.3. Com: U.S. ending stocks, 1950-1984.
U.S. ENDING STOCKS OF CORN U.S. ENDING STOCKS OF RICE
Figure 7.4. Cotton: U.S. ending stocks, 1950-1984. Figure 7.5. Rice: U.S. ending stocks, 1950-1984.
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agreeing to store (rather than sell), and maintain the 
quality of, a stipulated amount of their eligible crop 
as collateral. Eligibility for a nonrecourse loan may 
require compliance with acreage reductions or other 
supply control programs. The borrower may repay 
the loan plus interest any time within the stipulated 
loan period (usually 9 to 12 months). According to 
current policy, interest charges on repaid non­
recourse loans cannot be at a rate less than the rate of 
interest CCC must pay to borrow from the U.S. Treas­
ury. These interest rates have been subject to consid­
erable changes since 1977 and have been adjusted 
monthly since January 1981 (see table 7.1). If pro­
ducers do not find it profitable to repay the loan plus 
interest no later than the maturity date, both prin­
cipal and interest can be defaulted, in which case 
CCC has no other recourse (hence the name "non­
recourse loan”) but to assume ownership of the grain 
pledged as collateral. Delivery of the grain to the 
government satisfies all contractual arrangements 
between the producer and CCC.
The National Average Loan Rate
The national average loan rate, for use in disburs­
ing commodity loans for each crop, is announced each 
year by the secretary of agriculture under guidelines 
set by the Congress. The rate is announced for a 
standard production unit, such as a bushel, hundred­
weight, or pound, and is then adjusted for specific 
qualities of the crop and geographic locations of 
farms. Consequently, the loan rate for a particular 
crop can vary from county to county. Minimum na­
tional loan rates were set for the major crops by the 
Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 and the Agri­
culture and Food Act of 1981. The minimum loan 
rates for 1982-85 crops of wheat and com are $3.55 
and $2.55 per bushel, respectively. Loan rates for 
sorghum, barley, and oats are set in relation to corn, 
taking into account the feeding value of the com­
modity relative to that of corn. Special provisions of 
the 1981 act allow the secretary to reduce the loan 
rate for a particular crop by as much as 10 percent per 
year if the preceding year’s market price is less than 
105 percent of the preceding year’s loan rate for that 
crop, but under no circumstances can the loan rate for 
wheat be less than $3.00 per bushel, nor the loan rate 
for corn be less than $2.00 per bushel. The secretary 
used this authority to reduce the loan rate for wheat 
to $3.30 per bushel in 1984.
The Regular Loan Maturity Period
Commodity loans for a given year’s crops are made 
only within specified periods. Corn and sorghum 
loans are normally available from harvest until May 
31 of the following year. Loans for barley, oats, and 
wheat are available from harvest until March 31 of 
the following year. Occasionally, producers have been 
given additional time to take out loans.
The loan maturity period for most crops is 9 
months, that is, loans mature no later than the last 
day of the ninth month after the month the loan was
made. For example, if a producer had signed a loan 
contract in October 1983 on the newly harvested com 
crop, the loan would not have matured until the last 
day of July 1984. All rice loans mature on April 30. y  
Since rice loans may be taken out through March 31, 
it is possible to have only a 1-month loan period. 
Cotton loans may extend up to 18 months under cer­
tain price conditions. Unlike the reserve loans to be J 
discussed later, however, these nonrecourse com­
modity loans may be redeemed by producers at any 
time before maturity by payment of principal and 
interest. Storage costs and the maintenance of grain 
quality are the responsibility of the producer. The 
secretary of agriculture has discretionary authority 
to roll over, or extend, the original loan after the 
initial loan matures. In some years, this has been the 
basis of reseal programs in which nonrecourse loans I  
were allowed to be extended, thereby limiting the 
amount of grain defaulted to the government. #
The availability of a nonrecourse commodity loan 
program gives producers the financial capability and 
some incentive to forego marketing at harvest and 
wait for higher market prices. In so doing, the loan 
program tends to spread out marketings over the 
year. Since loans are redeemable upon demand, pro­
ducers can reap the benefits of their storage activity *1
whenever prices rise above principal and accumu­
lated interest charges. If prices do not rise and pro- 
ducers do not repay their loans, the government loses 
the accumulated interest and becomes the owner of I  
the grain. At a time of excess supplies, if a signifi­
cantly large portion of production enters the loan 
program and producers choose to forfeit their grain to 
CCC, then the national average loan rate may act as a 
price floor for the market.
a
CCC Purchases and Purchase Agreements
CCC purchases of grain are at the discretion of the «
secretary of agriculture. Direct purchases by CCC for 
price support or other purposes can be made (as oc- # 
curred after suspension of exports to the USSR in 
1980) at a price at least as high as the regular loan 
rate, but not higher than the CCC sales price. Pro­
ducers may also be offered commodity purchase 
agreements as well as loans. These agreements, ex­
ecuted at the option of the producer, provide for future 
outright purchases of contracted quantities of grain 
at a price at least equal to the county loan rate. Under 
both the loan and purchase agreement programs, 
producers have the option of selling their grain in the 
market before the contract maturity date. Com­
modity purchase agreements have seldom been used.
4
CCC Sales of Stocks
Under the provisions of the 1981 act, CCC-owned V 
stocks cannot be sold on the domestic market at a 
price less than 110 percent of the announced current ^
reserve release price. Under the 1977 act, the CCC 
release price was 150 percent of the current loan rate a  
when the grain reserve was in effect, but this was 
changed to 105 percent of the reserve call price by the I
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Table 7 .1 . In te r e s t  Rates on CCC Commodity Loans, 1976-1984
E ffe c t iv e  dates
and crop  years P ercent
A ll  1976 crops 
A ll  1977 crops 
A ll  1978 crops
1979 crops through A p r il 15, 1980 
1979 crops a f t e r  A p r il 15, 1980 
A ll  1980 crops
1981 crops through December 31, 1981
A ll  loans a f t e r  December 31, 1981, made in  s p e c i f ie d  m on th s :- ' 
1982: January 
February 
March 
A p r il 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
O ctober 
November 
December 
1983: January 
February 
March 
A p r il 
May 
June 
July  
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
1984: January 
February 
March 
A p r il 
May 
June 
July  
August 
September 
O ctober 
November 
December
7 .500 
6.000
7.000
9.000
13.000
11.500 1 /
14.500 1/
12.250
14.000
14.875
13.875
14.125 
13.625
13.500
14.000
12.000 
11.000
9.750
9.125
9.000  
8.625
9 .000
8.875
9.125
8.750
9.500  
10.000
10.500
10.375
9.875
9.875 
10.000 
10.000
9.875
10.375
10.875
11.375 
12.000
12.125
11.875 
11.750
11.250
10.125
1/
2/
in te r e s t  ra te  during ca lendar year 1981 on a l l  loans th a t had matured 
(o r  had been c a l le d  from the reserv e ) but were s t i l l  u n s e tt le d  was 15 25 
p ercen t.
The in te r e s t  ra te s  on new loans p la ced  in  a g iven  month are now v a r ie d  to  
r e f l e c t  the c o s t  to  CCC o f  borrow ing from the U.S. Treasury. The ra te s  on 
loans taken out during a s p e c i f ie d  month remain in  e f f e c t  on a p a r t ic u la r  
loan  at le a s t  u n t i l  January 1 o f  the fo llo w in g  y ea r , a t which tim e the 
in te r e s t  ra te  changes to  the new January l e v e l .  For example, a loan  taken 
out in  September 1983 and h e ld  fo r  9 months would have been charged fo r  4 
months at 10.500 p ercen t and 5 months at 10.000 p e rce n t.
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Table 7 .2 .  Reserve Program P r ice  Param eters, 1977-84 m arketing years 1 /
1977
2 /
1978
2 /
1979
2 /
1979
3 /
1980
4 /
1980
5 /
1981
6 /
1982
7 /
1983
8 /
1983
9 /
1984
10/
(D o lla rs  per Bushel)
Wheat:
Regular loan 2.25 2.35 2.35 2 .50 3 .00 3 .00 3 .20 3.55 3.65 3.65 3.30
Reserve loan 2.25 2.35 2.35 2 .50 3 .00 3 .30 3 .50 4 .00 3.65 3.65 3.30
R elease 3.15 3.29 3.29 3.75 4 .20 4 .20 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.45 4.45
C all 3 .94 4.11 4.11 4.63 5.25 5.25 4.65 11/ 11/ 11/ 11/
CCC s a le s 13/ 4.23 4.23 4.75 5.83 5.83 6 .2 2 12/ 12/ 12/ 12/
Corn:
Regular loan 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 2 .1 0 2.25 2.25 2 .40 2.55 2.65 2.65 2.55
Reserve loan 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 2 .1 0 2.25 2 .40 2.55 2 .90 2.65 2.65 2.55
R elease 2 .50 2 .50 2 .50 2.63 2.81 2.81 3.15 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25
C all 2 .80 2 .80 2 .80 3.05 3 .26 3 .26 3.15 11/ 11/ 11/ 11/
CCC s a le s 13/ 3 .00 3 .00 3.15 3 .42 3 .42 3.31 12/ 12/ 12/ 12/
B arley :
Regular loan 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.71 1.83 1.83 1.95 2 .08 2 .16 2.16 2.08
Reserve loan 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.71 1.83 1.95 2.07 2.37 2 .16 2.16 2.08
R elease 2 .04 2 .04 2 .04 2 .14 2.29 2.29 2.55 2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65
C a ll 2 .28 2 .28 2 .28 2 .48 2.65 2.65 2.55 11/ 11/ 11/ 11/
CCC s a le s 13/ 2 .44 2.45 2.57 2 .78 2 .78 2 .6 8 12/ 12/ 12/ 12/
Sorghum:
Regular loan 1.90 1.90 1.90 2 .0 0 2 .14 2 .14 2 .28 2 .42 2 .52 2.52 2.42
Reserve loan 1.90 1.90 1.90 2 .0 0 2 .14 2 .28 2 .42 2.75 2 .52 2.52 2.42
R elease 2 .38 2 .38 2 .38 2 .50 2 .6 8 2 .6 8 3 .00 3 .10 3 .10 3.10 3.10
C all 2 .6 6 2 .6 6 2 .6 6 2 .90 3 .10 3 .10 3 .00 11/ 11/ 11/ 11/
CCC sa le s 13/ 2.85 2.85 3 .00 3 .26 3 .26 3.15 12/ 12/ 12/ 12/
Oats :
Regular loan 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.08 1.16 1.16 1.24 1.31 1.36 1.36 1.31
Reserve loan 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.08 1.16 1.23 1.31 1.49 1.36 1.36 1.31
R elease 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.35 1.45 1.45 1.55 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65
C a ll 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.57 1 .6 8 1 .6 8 1.55 11/ 11/ 11/ 11/
CCC sa le s 13/ 1.54 1.55 1.62 1.76 1.76 1.63 12/ 12/ 12/ 12/
1 / Marketing years are June 1 to  May 31 fo r  wheat, b a r le y  and o a ts , and O ctober 1 to  
September 30 fo r  corn  and sorghum. P r ice s  are fo r  the i n i t i a l  year o f  each 
re s e r v e .
2 / Announced b e fo r e  the suspension  o f  exp orts  to  the S ov ie t  Union in  January 1980 
(Reserve I ) .
3/ Announced a f t e r  the suspension  o f  exp orts  to  the S ov ie t  Union (Reserve I I ) .
4 /  Announced b e fo r e  the A g r icu ltu re  Act o f  1980, which was passed on December 3,
1980 (Reserve I I I ) .
5 /  E f fe c t iv e  a f t e r  passage o f  the A g r icu ltu re  Act o f  1980 (Reserve I I I ) .
6 /  For g ra in  en tered  a f t e r  Ju ly  23 fo r  wheat and a f t e r  O ctober 6 fo r  feed  grains 
(Reserve I V ) .
7 / For 1982 m arketing year (Reserve V) as announced January 29, 1982 (excep t fo r  oats, 
announced in  August 1982).
8 /  For 1983 m arketing year (Reserve V ) .
9 /  A p p lies  to  a l l  wheat reserv e  co n tr a c ts  approved on or  a f t e r  January 19, 1984 
(R eserve VI fo r  wheat on ly )
■
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10/  Regular and reserve  loan  ra tes  apply  to  1984 crops r e f le c t in g  p r o v is io n s  o f  the 
A g r icu ltu ra l Programs Adjustment Act o f  1984, sign ed  A p r il 10, 1984.
11/  There i s  no c a l l  p r ic e  fo r  Reserves V and VI under the A g r icu ltu re  and Food A ct o f  
1981.
12/  No s a le s  p r ic e  announced. The le g is la t e d  minimum was 150 p ercen t o f  the loan  ra te  
u n t i l  December 3, 1980, when i t  became 105 p ercen t o f  the c a l l  p r ic e  u n t i l  1982, 
when i t  became 110 p ercen t o f  the r e le a s e  p r i c e .  The gen era l p o l i c y  has been fo r  
a re s a le  p r ic e  la rg e r  than the h igh est e x is t in g  c a l l  p r i c e .
13/  No s a le s  p r ic e  announced.
Agricultural Act of 1980. The sales price must be at 
least 115 percent of the loan rate when no reserve is in 
effect. Actual sales prices are established by county 
to reflect differences in the regional loan rates, and 
these prices may be raised to cover reasonable carry­
ing costs.
The restriction on the CCC sales price, under the 
1981 act, does not apply to commodities that have 
substantially deteriorated, to sales or disposals from 
the emergency feed program or disaster relief, or to 
sales of corn used for gasohol production. Grain (corn) 
for use in gasohol production, however, cannot be sold 
at less than the reserve release price.
The Farmer-Owned Reserve Program
The Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) program was 
established to help assure that adequate supplies of 
grain would be available, to strengthen farm prices, 
and to reduce the variability in grain prices over 
time. These objectives are pursued by establishing 
economic incentives and penalties that encourage 
producers to either store or sell grain. Incentives to 
place grain in the reserve increase as the market 
price falls toward or below the lower bound of the 
price corridor defined by the loan rate. The program 
encourages producers to market grain previously 
placed in the reserve when prices rise above the upper 
bound of the price corridor defined by the release 
price. Participants in the program pay a redemption 
charge and/or liquidated damages during the reserve 
contract period (3 to 5 years) if they market their 
reserve grain when market prices are below the re­
lease price. The loan and accrued interest may be 
repaid without penalty at the end of the contract 
period, or whenever the market price equals or ex­
ceeds the release price. There is no interest charge if 
a producer defaults on the loan and delivers the grain 
to CCC at the end of the contract. During 1977-81, 
there was also no interest charge if the grain was 
called. Reserve program price parameters for the 
1977-84 marketing years are presented in tables 7.2 
and 7.3.
Reserve programs for the 1982-85 marketing 
years are authorized for food quality wheat, corn, 
barley, grain sorghum, and oats. A rice reserve was 
implemented by the secretary of agriculture in 1977, 
but it has not been in effect since March 3,1980.
Participation and Eligibility 
Requirements for the FOR
To participate in the FOR, a producer must enter 
into a 3-year grain reserve agreement with the 
county ASCS office. The decision to participate in the 
grain reserve program is based on a producer’s expec­
tation for financial gain. Participation in the reserve 
is usually a decision to forego current marketings in 
the hope that prices will increase in the future.
Although the FOR is voluntary, not all crop pro­
ducers are automatically eligible to participate. The 
Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 and the Agri­
culture and Food Act of 1981 limit participation in the 
FOR to producers who comply with commodity pro­
gram provisions. When acreage control programs are 
in effect, the degree of participation determines the 
potential supply of grain that can enter the reserve 
during that particular marketing year. If the secre­
tary does not announce acreage control provisions, all 
producers are eligible for government programs if 
they report their current planted acreage to the local 
ASCS office.
Congress, in April 1980, permitted the secretary 
of agriculture to make nonrecourse loans on the 1979 
crops of corn and wheat to producers who did not 
participate in the 1979 set-aside programs (P. L. 
96-234). The justification for this temporary depar­
ture from previous legislation was to encourage 
greater participation in the corn and wheat reserve 
programs to strengthen market prices after the sus­
pension of grain exports to the USSR.
The FOR Incentives and Contract
Participants in the FOR obtain a nonrecourse 
commodity loan and sign a reserve contract that stip­
ulates the conditions that must exist before grain 
placed in the reserve may be sold or the original loan 
repaid without penalty. Also specified in the contract 
are the terms of payment to the producer for storage 
of reserve grain, the producer’s responsibilities for 
ensuring grain quality, and penalties for early with­
drawal of grain from the reserve.
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Table 7 .3 .  R elease and C a ll P r ice s  in  D if fe r e n t  R eserves During the 1977-84 Marketing 1  
Years 1 /
Percent
o f  loan  1977 1978 1979 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1983 1984
2 / 3 / 4 /  5 /  6 /
(D o lla rs  per Bushel)
Wheat r e le a s e  p r ic e :
Reserve I 140 3.15 3.29 3.29 3 .50 4 .20 4 .48 4.97 5 .11 5.11 4.62
Reserve I I 150 — — 3.75 4 .50 4 .80 5.33 5 .48 5.48 4.95
Reserve I I I 140 4 .20 4 .48 4.97 5.11 5.11 4.62
Reserve IV 145 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65
Reserve V 131 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65
Reserve VI 122 4.45 4.65
Wheat c a l l  
Reserve
p r ic e :
I 175 3.95 4.11 4 .11 4 .38 5 .25 5 .60 6.21 6.39 6.39 5.78
Reserve I I 185 — — — 4.63 5.55 5 .92 6 .57 6 .76 6.76 6.11
Reserve I I I 175 5.25 5 .60 6 .21 6.39 6.39 5.78
Reserve IV 7 / 145 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65 4.65
Reserve V 8 / - -
Reserve VI 8 / —
Corn re le a s e  p r ic e :
Reserve I 125 2.50 2 .50 2 .50 2.63 2.81 9 / —  9 /—  9 / - -  9 / - -  9 / - - «Reserve I I 125 — — — 2.63 2.81 9 /—  9/—  9/—  9/—  9 / - -
Reserve I I I 125 2.81 9/—  9/—  9 /—  9/—  9/— «Reserve IV 131 3.15 3 .15 3.15 3.15 3.15
Reserve V 127 3.25 3 .25 3.25 3.25 i
Corn c a l l  p r ic e :
9 /—  9/—  9/—  9/—  9 /—
»
Reserve I 140 2.80 2 .80 2 .80 2 .94 3.15
Reserve I I  
Reserve I I I
145
145
— — — 3.05 3 .26
3 .26
9 / —  9/—  9/—  9 /—  9 /— 
9 /—  9 /—  9 / - -  9 /—  9 /— 4
Reserve IV 7 / 131 3.15 3 .15 3.15 3.15 3.15 &
Reserve V 8 /
Sorghum r e le a s e  p r ice » •
10/ -  10/ —  10/ —  10/ —  10/ "
J
Reserve I 125 2.38 2 .38 2.38 2 .50 2 .6 8 m
Reserve I 125 — - - 2 .50 2 .6 8 10/ -  10/ —  10/ —  10/ —  10/ — ■
Reserve I I I 125 2 .6 8 10/ -  10/ —  10/ —  10/ — 10/ — v
Reserve IV 131 3.01  3 .01  3 .01  3.01 3.01
Reserve V 127 —  3.11  3 .11  3.11 3.11 |
Sorghum c a l l  p r ic e :
10/ -  10/ —  10/ —  10/ —  i o / — IReserve I 140 2 .6 6 2 .6 6 2 .6 6 2.80 3 .00
Reserve I I 145 — — |p 2.80 3.11 10/ -  107—  10/ —  10/ —  10/ —
Reserve I I I 145 3.11 10/ -  10/ —  10/ —  10/ — 10/ — j
Reserve»IV  7 / 131 3.01  3 .01  3 .01 3.01 3.01 1Reserve V 8 / — — — — —
B arley r e le a s e  p r ic e
i l / -  i l / —  l i / —  u / — jy /r f t
1
Reserve I 125 2 .04 2 .04 2 .04 2 .14 11/ -
Reserve II 125 — — — 2.14 2.29 2 .44  2 .60  2 .70  2 .7 0 . 2.bU
Reserve I I I  125 - -  —  —  - -  2 .29  2 .44  2 .60  2 .70  2.70 2.60 I
Reserve IV 131 —  —  - -  —  —  2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55 i
Reserve V 127 - -  —  - -  - -  - -  —  2.65 2.65 2.65 2.65
B arley c a l l  p r ic e :
Reserve I 140 2.29 2.29 2.29 2 .40 11/ - 11/ - 11/ - -  11/ —  11/ —  11/ —
Reserve I I 145 — — — 2.48 2 .6 6 2.83 3 .02  3 .14  3 .1 4  3 .02
Reserve I I I 145 2 .6 6 2.83 3 .02  3 .1 4  3 .1 4  3 .02
Reserve IV 7 / 131 2.55 2 .55  2 .55  2 .55  2 .55
Reserve V 8 /
Oats re le a se  p r ic e :
Reserve I 125 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.35 1.45 12/ - 12/ —  12/ —  12/ —  12/ —
Reserve I I 125 — — — 1.35 1.45 12/ - 12/ —  12/ —  12 / —  12 / —
Reserve I I I 125 1.45 12/ - 12/ —  12/ —  12 / —  12 / —
Reserve IV 131 — — — — — 1 3 /- 1 3 /—  1 3 /—  1 3 /—  1 3 /—
Reserve V 127 1.65 1.71 1.71 1.65
Oats c a l l  p r ic e :
Reserve I 140 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.52 1.63 12/ - 12/ —  12/ —  12/ —  12/ —
Reserve I I 145 — — — 1.57 1.69 12/ - 12 / —  12/ —  12/ —  12/ —
Reserve I I I 145 1.69 12/ - 12/ —  12/ —  12/ —  12/ —
Reserve IV 7 / 131 — — — — — 1 3 /- 1 3 /—  1 3 /—  1 3 /—  1 3 /—
Reserve V 8 /
—  = Not a p p lica b le  fo r  the year s p e c i f ie d .
1 / Marketing years are June 1 to  May 31 fo r  wheat, b a r le y , and o a ts , and O ctober 1 to  
September 30 fo r  corn  and sorghum. Reserve I param eters are fo r  g ra in  en tered  into 
the FOR b e fo re  January 7, 1980 (when exp orts  to  the USSR were suspended).
Reserve I I  param eters are fo r  g ra in  en tered  during January 8 through August 24, 
1980. Reserve I I I  i s  fo r  gra in  en tered  a f t e r  August 24, 1980, and Reserve IV i s  
fo r  gra in  en tered  a f t e r  O ctober 6 , 1981, fo r  feed  g ra in s , and a f t e r  Ju ly  23, 1981, 
fo r  wheat. Reserve arrangements made on or a f t e r  May 14, 1982, fo r  wheat and 
b a r le y , Ju ly  1, 1982, fo r  corn  and sorghum, and August 2 , 1982, fo r  o a ts , are 
covered  by Reserve V. Reserve VI was e s ta b lis h e d  fo r  wheat on January 19, 1984.
2 / The re le a se  and c a l l  p r ic e s  fo r  Reserves Xj I I ,  and I I I  were e s ta b lis h e d  as a
percen t o f  the regu la r CCC loan  r a te . The p ercen ts  fo r  the f i r s t  year o f  Reserve 
IV and V are shown fo r  com parison purposes but were n ot s p e c i f ie d  in  the program.
3 / Announced b e fo re  the suspension  o f  exp orts  to  the S ov ie t  Union in  January 1980.
4 / Announced a f t e r  the suspension  o f  exp orts  to  the S ov ie t  Union.
5 / A pplies to  a l l  feed  g ra in  arrangements made fo r  the 1983 crop  and to  a l l  wheat 
arrangements made on o ld  crop  b e fo re  January 19, 1984.
6 /  A pp lies to  a l l  new crop  wheat arrangements approved on or  a f t e r  January 19, 1984 
(Reserve V I ) .
7 / The c a l l  p r ic e s  were se t  equal to  the r e le a s e  p r ic e s  in  Reserve IV, but the
se cre ta ry  does not have to  e x e r c is e  h is  op tion s  to  c a l l  the reserv e  a t th is  p r i c e .
8 /  C a ll p r ic e s  were e lim in ated  under the A g r icu ltu re  and Food Act o f  1981 fo r  the 
1982-85 marketing yea r .
9 / Reserve re le a se  and c a l l  p r ic e  t r ig g e r s  fo r  corn  fo r  R eserves I ,  I I ,  and I I I  are
not a p p lica b le  a f t e r  the 1980 marketing year s in ce  corn  Reserve I was c a l le d  on
O ctober 30, 1980, and corn  Reserves I I  and I I  were c a l le d  on December 30, 1980.
10/  Reserve re le a se  and c a l l  p r ic e  t r ig g e r s  fo r  sorghum fo r  R eserves I ,  I I ,  and I I I  
not a p p lica b le  a f t e r  the 1980 marketing year s in ce  sorghum Reserve I was c a l le d  
July 17, 1980, sorghum Reserve I I  was c a l le d  Ju ly  25, 1980, and sorghum Reserve I I  
was c a l le d  November 6 , 1980.
1_1/ Reserve re le a se  and c a l l  p r ic e  t r ig g e r s  fo r  b a r le y  fo r  Reserve I are n ot a p p lic a b i 
a ft e r  the 1979 marketing year s in ce  b a r le y  Reserve I was c a l le d  June 26, 1979.
12/ Reserve re le a se  and c a l l  p r ic e  t r ig g e r s  fo r  oa ts  fo r  R eserves I ,  I I ,  and I I I  are
not a p p lica b le  a f t e r  the 1980 marketing year s in ce  oa ts  Reserve I was c a l le d  
May 23, 1980, oa ts  Reserve I I  was c a l le d  July 15, 1980, and oa ts  Reserve I I I  was 
c a l le d  September 17, 1980.
1 3 / There are no oa ts  in  Reserve IV because the market p r ic e  exceeded the announced 
re le a se  p r ic e  fo r  oa ts  Reserve IV a l l  yea r .
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The Reserve Loan Rate
The reserve loan rate for a particular marketing 
year determines the per bushel amount of the non­
recourse loan received by the producer in different 
regions of the country upon placing grain in the re­
serve. Under the 1981 act, the secretary of agriculture 
establishes the national loan rate for the reserve, 
which must be as least as high as that for the regular 
nonrecourse loan (see table 7.2). For the 1980,1981, 
and 1982 crop years, a national loan premium for the 
reserve (the reserve loan rate less the regular loan 
rate) was added to each county nonrecourse loan rate 
to obtain the county reserve loan rate.
The Release Price
The release price is the level that the average U.S. 
market price must attain before reserve loans may be 
repaid and the grain sold without penalty. Under the 
1981 act (and the Agricultural Act of 1980), the na­
tional release price is established by the secretary of 
agriculture and cannot be changed over the life of the 
initial contract. Release prices changed under the 
1977 act whenever regular loan rates changed be­
cause the release price was set as a percentage of the 
national average nonrecourse loan rate currently in 
effect. The release price for wheat was restricted by 
the 1977 act to between 140 and 160 percent of the 
regular loan rate. There was no restriction on the 
relationship between the loan rate and release price 
for corn, but release for other feed grains has usually 
been set relative to that for corn by using feeding 
value relationships.
The Call Price
Call prices were used before the 1981 act to define 
the level to which average U.S. market prices must 
rise before the secretary could require producers to 
repay their reserve loans or forfeit reserve grain to 
CCC. As with the release price, the reserve contract 
for wheat stipulated the call price as a percentage of 
the current national average nonrecourse loan rate, 
up until the passage of the Agricultural Act of 1980 
on December 3,1980. The 1977 act required the wheat
call price to be at least 175 percent of the regular loan 
rate. There were no restrictions on feed grain call 
prices.
There are no mandated call provisions or call 
prices under the 1981 act. The secretary of agri­
culture may, however, "call” reserve grain before the 
contract maturity date if it is determined that emer­
gency conditions require making the reserve grain 
available for urgent domestic or international needs.
The feed grain release prices were set at 125 per­
cent and the call price at 140 or 145 percent of the 
regular loan rate in the initial 4 years of the program 
to provide an acceptable degree of price stability to 
the livestock sector. In contrast, the price band for 
wheat was wider with release prices at 140 or 150 
percent of loan rates and call prices at 175 or 185 
percent of the loan rate. Since 1981, the wheat price 
band has been narrower than in earlier years, while 
the size of the feed grain band increased. Also, the J 
size of the spread between release and call prices was 
larger for wheat than for feed grains in the initial 
years of the program. Call prices were 12 to 16 percent 
higher than release prices for feed grains compared 
with 23 to 25 percent for wheat (see tables 7.2 and 
7.3).
i
Storage Payments
Storage payments compensate producers for the 
costs of storing reserve grain. Payments are made in J 
advance on an annual basis for the grain in the re­
serve. Under the 1981 act, a single national storage 
payment rate is to be set by the secretary to encour­
age participation. The payment rates are the same for 
all producers (see table 7.4).
Although storage payments are made in advance, 
payments cease (and unearned advances must be re­
imbursed to the government) after the second con­
secutive month that the national 5-day moving 
average market price equals or exceeds the release 
price. Cessation of storage payments, by reducing the J
expected returns to storage, induces withdrawals 
from the reserve and, thus, an increase in the supply I  
of grain to the market. Storage payments resume 
when the reserve is no longer in release status.
I
Table 7 .4 .  Storage Payment Rates fo r Reserve Grain 1
Commodity
12/ 6 /77  to  
2 /1 7 /7 8
2 /1 8 /7 8  to  
1/  6 /80
A fte r
1 / 7 /80  J
Wheat 20
(Cents per B u sh el)1 / 
25 26.5 J
Corn 20 25 26.5
B arley 20 25 26.5 J
Sorghum 20 25 26.5
Oats 15 19 20 J
R ice 65 65 85
|
1/ R ice ra te s  are cen ts  per hundredweight.
•- ■ ■ ■ \
I
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Storage payment provisions were modified from 
November 1978 through 1981 to allow storage pay­
ments to continue to producers in states with rela­
tively low farm prices even if the release price was 
reached nationally. Continuation of storage pay­
ments encouraged producers in such states to keep 
their grain in the reserve rather than to market it. 
This special provision has not been used since 1981.
Interest Rates on FOR Loans
An interest charge on the reserve loan may have 
to be paid by the producer. Although the interest rate 
on regular and reserve loans is to be based on the rate 
charged to CCC by the U.S. Treasury (table 7.1), the 
secretary of agriculture exercises considerable lati­
tude in setting the interest rate. The secretary may 
waive or adjust actual interest payments. Histor­
ically, the announced interest rate on commodity 
loans has been less than that from other credit 
sources, and effective average interest over the life of 
the contract has been reduced because of interest 
waivers.
Interest charges on reserve loans after the first 
year that grain is in the reserve have been waived 
since March 29,1978. Also, in an effort to stimulate 
entry of grain into the reserve after the suspension of 
grain exports to the USSR in January 1980, the secre­
tary waived the first year’s interest charge for the 
first 512 million bushels of com to enter the reserve 
after October 22,1979. For similar reasons, the Agri­
cultural Act of 1980 required the secretary to waive 
interest on reserve loans made on the 1980 and 1981 
crops of wheat and feed grains. The complete elimina­
tion of interest charges stipulated by the 1980 act, 
however, was repealed by P. L. 97-24, signed into law 
July 23, 1981. Since then, the interest waiver has 
been applied only to the second and third year the 
grain remains in the reserve. The waiver is cancelled 
if the reserve is in release status. The secretary of 
agriculture has the discretionary authority to charge 
interest even in the second or third year, or to in­
crease interest rates in any year, if this is deemed 
necessary to induce producers to market reserve 
grains.
Revision of Reserve Contracts
Revision of reserve contracts before maturity has 
taken place in the past when reserve provisions for 
new contracts were changed. Participating farmers 
had the option of changing their contract provisions 
but could not be forced to do so. This should be kept in 
mind in assessing the current program price param­
eters that apply to farmers in general. Because more 
than one kind of contract may be outstanding at any 
point in time, different producers may have different 
release prices at the same time (see table 7.3).
To identify the major policy changes affecting the 
reserve program, reserve contracts have been labeled
Reserves I, II, III, IV, V, and VI. All eligible com­
modities in the reserve before January 7,1980, are in 
Reserve I, unless a conversion agreement to a later 
reserve was signed. Reserve II contains grain placed 
from January 8 through August 24,1980. Reserve II 
contract provisions were specifically designed to in­
duce greater participation in the reserve program 
after the suspension of exports to the Soviet Union. 
Under Reserve II provisions, wheat release and call 
prices as a percentage of loan rates were each in­
creased by 10 percentage points, and the call price for 
the feed grain reserve was increased by 5 percentage 
points. In addition, the first-year interest on com 
reserve loans was waived for com entering the re­
serve between October 22,1979, and August 25,1980.
The provisions of Reserve III contracts applied to 
all reserve agreements approved from August 25, 
1980, to October 6,1981. Producers with Reserve I or 
Reserve II agreements could convert to Reserve III by 
signing a new agreement, as long as the commodity 
was not in call status. Reserve IV contracts were 
offered for feed grains placed in the reserve between 
October 6, 1981, and July 1,1982 (May 14, 1982, for 
barley), and for wheat placed in the reserve between 
July 23,1981, and May 14,1982. The 1982 programs 
authorized immediate entry of wheat and barley into 
Reserve V beginning May 14,1981, and of com and 
sorghum beginning July 1,1982. Reserve VI was es­
tablished for the 1983 wheat crop beginning January 
19,1984. Since the reserve provisions for feed grains 
were not changed for the 1983 programs, new entries 
of feed grains into the reserve are still covered by 
Reserve V.
As of January 1,1985, reserve contracts were still 
outstanding for Wheat Reserves III, IV, V, and VI, 
Com Reserves V and VI, Oats Reserve V, Barley 
Reserves III, IV, and V, and Sorghum Reserves IV and 
V. The other reserves have either matured or have 
been called. A chronology of events related to the 
Farmer-Owned Reserves appears in the Appendix.
Penalties for Early Withdrawal of FOR Grain
The Farm Storage Grain Reserve Agreement be­
tween CCC and a producer entering grain into the 
FOR contains an explicit understanding that repay­
ment of the reserve loan by the producer before matu­
rity at a time when the market price is less than the 
release level will cause serious and substantial 
damages to CCC, including damages to CCC’s price 
support and reserve programs and the incurring of 
substantial administrative and other costs. Hence, 
there are substantial penalties for early withdrawal 
for FOR grain. If grain in Reserves IV, V, or VI is 
withdrawn early, current regulations require the re­
payment of the original loan and acccumulated inter­
est, return of unearned storage payments, and the 
payment of liquidated damages equal to half the an­
nual CCC interest rate times the amount of the origi­
nal loan.
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Maintenance of FOR Grain Quality
The quality of grain placed in the FOR is deter­
mined by inspection before the reserve loan is 
approved. While the grain is in storage, the producer 
is responsible for maintaining the quality of grain. 
The warehouse normally provides that service for 
producers when reserve grain is stored in a commer­
cial storage facilitiy. Producers may be permitted to 
market grain of deteriorating quality if it is replaced 
within a specified time by grain of the same quality 
described in the reserve contract. The reserve con­
tract requires participating producers to have avail­
able for delivery at the designated place of storage 
both the quality and quantity of grain covered by the 
contract.
Opening, Closing, and Release 
and Call Status of the FOR
Whether reserve contracts are available to eligi­
ble producers at any given time depends on certain 
administrative procedures involving the timing of 
new contracts, limitations on the total size of the 
reserve, and grain release and call procedures. Oper­
ation of a grain reserve for both feed grains and wheat 
is mandatory under the 1981 act, but grain can be 
placed in the reserve only under certain conditions. 
The reserve may be "closed” (new contracts not avail-
able) if total reserve stocks exceed an announced 
maximum limit, if grain is in release or call status, or 4
if the time period specified for entry of grain has not 
started or is past. Beginning with the 1981 marketing J  
year, the reserve is generally "open” if not in release 
status. J
The secretary of agriculture has the authority to 
restrict grain eligible for the reserve to grain that has 1
first been placed in the regular loan program for the 
full 9-month loan period. This authority was used 
when the reserve program was first established for 1 
the 1977 crop year and again in 1983. For other crop 
years, producers have been given permission to place I 
grain either directly into the reserve upon harvest (as 
in 1982) or before outstanding CCC loans matured. I
Capping the Reserve
The secretary of agriculture has authority to cap I 
the reserve, which effectively closes the reserve to 
further entry of grain, if total reserve stocks exceed I 
the announced level. Congress, in the 1981 act, set a 
minimum level on the announced maximum size of 
the reserve. The announced maximum size of the I 
reserve cannot be less than 700 million bushels for 
wheat nor less than 1 billion bushels for feed grains.
This superseded the 1977 act, which specified a wheat 
reserve of not less than 300 nor more than 700 million I
bushels of wheat, with no restrictions on feed grains.
Table 7.5. Average and Adjusted Daily Terminal Prices in Major Markets for Use 
in Determining Release Status for Wheat, August 1982 1/
Date Daily major
market price 2/
Daily
adjusted 5-day moving average
price 3/ of market prices 4/
(Dollars per bushel) J
Specified days 
in August:
2 3.96 3.23 3.25
3 3.96 3.23 3.24
4 3.95 3.22 3.23
5 3.93 3.20 3.22
6 3.90 3.17 3.21
9 3.83 3.10 3.18
10 3.81 3.08 3.15
11 3.83 3.10 3.13
12 3.83 3.10 3.11
13 3.88 3.15 3.11
1/ Release status is attained if the 5-day moving average of adjusted daily 
prices in major markets is equal to or greater than the; current release 
price for 5 consecutive days.
2/ The daily major market price is the simple unweighted average of prices 
reported by AMS for Kansas City (No. 1 Hard Red Winter Wheat, ordinary 
protein), Minneapolis (No. 1 Dark Northern Spring Wheat», 14 percent protein), 
and Portland (No. 1 Soft White Wheat),
3/ This is the daily major market price minus a monthly adjustment factor
calculated to make the average adjusted daily price for the 13th through the 
17th of the previous month equal to the midmonth price received by farmers 
as reported by the Statistical Reporting Service.
4/ This is the simple 5-day average of adjusted prices for the current and four 
preceding days.
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FOR Release Status
Release status for reserve grain is achieved when 
the national average market price for a commodity is 
equal to or greater than the announced reserve re­
lease price for at least one day. The national average 
market price is a 5-day moving average of adjusted 
daily prices. The daily price is based on the simple 
average of the daily prices for selected major markets 
and grades as reported by the Agricultural Market­
ing Service (AMS). Since no daily AMS prices are 
available for rice, only Statistical Reporting Service 
(SRS) midmonth rice prices are used to determine 
release status for rice when there is a rice reserve. An 
example of the computation procedure to determine 
the national average market price of wheat is pre­
sented in table 7.5. The markets and grades for feed 
grains are shown in table 7.6.
When the release level is reached for a commodity, 
the minimum initial release period is the remainder 
of the month in which release is announced plus the 
next month. During this period of 4 to 8 weeks, pro­
ducers have the opportunity to redeem the reserve 
grain, pay accumulated interest, and repay unearned 
storage payments. If, at the end of this period, the 
national 5-day average price (as defined earlier) con­
tinues to exceed the current release level, release 
status will remain in effect for at least another 
month, storage payments will cease, and interest is 
charged on the reserve loans in release status. If the 
national average price subsequently drops below the 
release level, the terms of the reserve agreement 
before release are again in effect. In particular, the 
commodity will not be eligible for redemption with­
out a penalty, storage payments will again be earned, 
and interest waivers will be applicable.
Both release prices and call prices are unqiue to 
the different reserves (I-VI). Since trigger prices may
be different, one reserve may be in release status 
while another may not.
FOR Call Status
Call status for reserve grain under the 1981 act 
occurs only if the secretary determines that emer­
gency conditions exist which require that such com­
modities must be made available in the market to 
meet urgent domestic and international needs. The 
secretary must report the intention to call reserve 
loans to the President and to the Senate and House 
agriculture committees at least 14 days before the 
effective date for call status.
Under the 1977 act (as amended), procedures es­
tablished by the secretary to determine call status for 
grain in Reserves I, II, and III involve comparing the 
national average market price to the previously an­
nounced call price. Grain is "called” if the average 
price exceeds the call price for 5 consecutive days. 
Having achieved call status, producers are obligated 
to repay their reserve loans and accrued interest 
charges (or forfeit the commodity under loan). Un­
earned storage payments must be repaid. Although 
producers are not required to sell their grain, pro­
ducers normally market their grain to repay their 
loans.
By September 1982, call status had been achieved 
for all com, oats, and sorghum in Reserves I, II, and 
III, and for barley in Reserve I. Wheat has never been 
called.
Producers with grain in Reserves I, II, or III have 
90 days (30 days before 1980) upon notification from 
their county ASCS office to redeem their reserve loan 
on called grain. If the loan is not redeemed within 90 
days, CCC may take title to the grain. The secretary 
also has authority to delay the date of loan settlement
Table 7.6. Selected Major Markets and Crop Grades Used in Computing Average 
Market Prices
Grade Selected markets
Wheat No. 1 Hard Red Winter 
No. 1 Dark Northern Spring 
No. 1 Soft White
Kansas City 
Minneapolis 
Portland
Corn No. 2 Yellow Kansas City, Omaha,
St. Louis, Minneapolis
Sorghum No. 1 Yellow Texas High Plains, 
Kansas City
Barley No. 2 Feed Minneapolis 1/
Oats No. 2 White Heavy Minneapolis
1/ Effective as of May 22, 1980. Specific markets used for barley in Reserve I 
will depend on where the majority of reserve barley is stored.
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for additional 30-day periods in areas where condi­
tions exist that might disrupt or prevent the orderly 
marketing of reserve grain. Under this authority, the 
secretary granted in April 1981 an indefinite exten­
sion on the repayment of corn reserve loans that had 
been called, with the stipulation that 15.25 percent 
interest be charged on the loans. The secretary also 
announced on July 24,1981, that grain would only be 
called from future reserves in an emergency, and call 
prices were simply set equal to the release prices.
The Farm Storage Facility Loan Program
The Farm Storage Facility Loan program, admin­
istered by ASCS, provides credit to producers to 
purchase on-farm storage structures. Although ma­
jor program revisions were made in 1977, the pro­
gram has operated continuously since 1949, with 
funds prov ided  by the C om m odity  C redit 
Corporation.
The objective of the facility loan program is to 
encourage the storage of grain in on-farm facilities. 
The facility loan program seeks to encourage the 
growth of on-farm storage capacity to enable pro­
ducers to use the commodity loan programs.
Specific provisions of the facility loan program 
have varied over the years in regard to the com­
modities and kinds of structures covered, maximum 
amount of loans, interest rate and repayment period, 
and whether or not cross compliance with other pro­
grams was required as a condition for eligibility. The 
following provisions are applicable for new loans 
made based on changes implemented on July 2,1982, 
and August 20, 1982.
Loans can be made to producers of wheat, rice, or 
feed grains for the construction of storage facilities 
such as conventional bins, flat and multipurpose 
structures for. drying grain, and silo-type structures 
for high moisture, grain. Structures for forage and 
silage and drying and handling equipment are not 
currently eligible for loans, although they have some­
times been eligible in the past. There also is cur­
rently a cross compliance requirement that restricts 
eligibility to those producers in compliance with pro­
gram provisions.
The amount of the loan depends on the size of the 
facility for which a loan is obtained, specified loan 
maximums, and the minimum down payment. Loans 
are available to build storage facilities for wheat, rice, 
feed grains, and soybeans, if soybeans are produced 
on the same farm, but pre-existing storage space 
must be subtracted from the amount needed for stor­
age of 2 years’ production unless the existing storage 
is being used to store FOR grain. The maximum 
amount of the new loan cannot exceed $25,000, and
the aggregate loan balance for an individual pro­
ducer cannot exceed $50,000. Also, no more than 70 
percent of the cost may be financed through the 
program.
The maximum term for new storage facility loans 
is currently 5 years, and the interest rate is the same 
rate as for new commodity loans, determined by the 
month in which the loan is obtained (see table 7.1). 
These interest rates, based on the cost to CCC of 
borrowing from the U.S. Treasury, are to be reviewed 
on January 1 and adjusted if necessary.
Summary
The major program for implementing U.S. grain 
reserve policy is the Farmer-Owned Reserve, which 
offers producers loans and other incentives in return 
for an agreement by the producer to defer grain sales 
for up to 3 years. Reserve grain may be sold without 
penalty whenever market prices rise above the pro­
gram release price. The long-standing program of 
regular nonrecourse commodity loans, purchases, 
and sales of grain by the government also continues 
and can be used to supplement or replace the FOR 
program in the pursuit of the main objectives—price 
and income support and reduced price variability. 
These two programs, in combination with the Farm 
Facility Storage Loans and the Food Security Wheat 
Reserve programs, make up the overall grain reserve 
package. Actual market consequences of these pro­
grams depend on the voluntary responses of pro­
ducers and policymakers to changing market condi­
tions. Program participants must be producers and 
must comply with acreage reduction or set-aside pro­
grams when announced by the secretary of 
agriculture.
Although a number of changes have been made in 
the details of the FOR program over time, the basic 
nature has remained the same since its inception in 
1977. Major policy decisions affecting the outcome of 
the program relate to acreage control (because of the 
cross-compliance provisions), size limitations on the 
reserve (because the reserve is closed if the size limits 
are exceeded), and the level of incentives offered to 
producers to encourage their participation.
Of particular importance for the operation of the 
program are the procedures established for the re­
lease of reserve grain. The quantity of grain released 
from the FOR depends on the decisions made or rules 
established for adjusting storage payments and in­
terest rates when prices exceed the upper level of the 
FOR price band (the release price). No specific rules 
exist for selling grain owned by the government, ex­
cept that sale prices have to be at least 110 percent of 
the FOR release price when a grain reserve is in 
effect.
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Appendix: Major Developments in 
U.S. Reserve Programs, 1977-1984
The follow ing is a b rief su m m ary o f official U S D  A  news  
releases p ertain in g to U .S . reserve program s prepared by  
O rville  O verboe, C o m m od ity  A n a ly s is  D iv ision , A S C S . 
T his chronology allow s th e reader to trace the specific de­
ta ils related to the reserve activities discussed in  m ain  text.
A pril 4 , 1977— U S D  A  established  a form al grain  reserve  
w ith explicit operating ru les for th e 1976  crop w heat and  
rice. T h is program  was authorized under pre-existing legis­
lative authority.
A u g . 2 6 ,1 9 7 7 — T he P resident m ade a decision to accum u­
late 3 0 -3 5  m illion  tons o f  food and feed grains in the grain  
reserve by June 3 0 ,1 9 7 8 . T h is was to include 17-19 m illion  
tons o f feed grains, 8  m illion  tons o f w heat and rice in a 
producer-held reserve, a  6  m illion  ton em ergency food re­
serve, p lu s an y  C C C  stocks acquired th rou g h  th e loan  
program .
Sept. 2 9 ,1 9 7 7 — A  F arm er-O w ned R eserve (FO R ) program , 
essentially  identical to the program  announced in A p ril, 
was m andated, and the m in im u m  sales price for C C C  stocks 
increased under provisions o f the Food and A gricu ltu ral 
A ct of 1977 (P.L. 95-113). M a in  provisions o f the program  
are:
Extended C C C  loans for 3 -5  years was th e basis for the  
reserve.
Mandated commodity coverage applied only to w heat, 
but a feed grain  reserve was also authorized.
Cross-compliance w ith  an y  set-aside program  in effect 
was required as a condition o f e lig ib ility  for com m odity  
loans or the Farm er-O w ned R eserve.
Size limits applied only to w heat; th e reserve was to con­
tain  3 0 0 -7 0 0  m illion  bush els o f  w heat.
Storage subsidies to participants included storage pay­
m ents to producers to cover cost o f storage and w aiver or 
adjustm ent o f interest on loans as determ ined by the secre­
tary of agriculture.
Release and call provisions were to be established to 
encourage "re le a se ” o f grain  and to require (to "c a ll” for) 
repaym ent of C C C  loans w hen prices rise to certain release  
or call-price trigger levels set in  relation to the loan  rate.
Limitations on sale of CCC grain now  involved a m in i­
m um  sale price o f 150 percent o f th e C C C  loan  rate w hen a  
reserve program  is in  effect, com pared w ith  115 percent 
with no reserve.
Dec. 6 ,1 9 7 7 — Storage p aym en t rates for participating pro­
ducers were established at 2 0  cents per bu shel for a ll e lig i­
ble crops, except for oats, w hich w as 15 cents. The reserve  
was open to 1976  crop w heat and rice, as previously an ­
nounced, p lus 1976  and 1 977  crop feed grain s and 1977 crop 
wheat. G rain could be placed in  th e reserve after m atu rity  
of a 9 -m onth  C C C  loan.
Feb. 6 , 1978— B egin n in g  M arch  1, 1978 , a ll 1977 barley, 
oats, and w heat could be placed directly into the reserve.
Feb. 18, 1978— Increased reserve storage p aym en t rates  
from  2 0  to 2 5  cents for w h eat, c o m , grain  sorgh u m , and  
barley, and from  15 to 19 cents for oats.
Feb. 2 8 , 1 9 7 8 — T h e  la st d ay for tra n sfe rrin g  1 9 7 6  crop  
w h ea t, b a rley , an d  oa ts u n d er lo a n  in to  th e  re se rv e  
program .
M arch  2 9 ,1 9 7 8 — R em oved th e 3 3 0  m illion  bu sh el ceilin g  
on th e F O R  portion o f th e w heat reserve in  order to  rem ove  
an y excess 1977  crop production. E n try  o f grain  into the  
reserve w as allow ed before m atu rity  o f  th e 9 -m o n th  C C C  
loan , and the w aiver o f  in terest charges on reserve loans  
after th e first year was granted . T h ese procedures have  
been continued m ost years thereafter, a lth ou gh  th ey m ay  
be changed at th e discretion o f the secretary.
M arch  31, 1978— D ead lin e for ob tain in g a  price support 
loan  on 1977  crop w heat, barley, and oats.
J u ly  5 , 1978— T rigger release price reached for grain  re­
serve barley.
J u ly  2 8 ,1 9 7 8 — A nn ou n ced  a new  form u la  for d eterm in in g  
elig ib ility  o f  farm ers to continue earn in g  storage on an y  
com m odity in  a  "re le a se  status” from  th e F O R  program .
J u ly  2 9 ,1 9 7 8 — A nn ou n ced  a 3 0 -d a y  extension in  loan  m a ­
tu rity  dates. A lso , the c o m  and sorgh u m  loan  program  w as 
reopened for 2  m on th s to ru n  th rough Septem ber 2 9 ,1 9 7 8 ,  
bu t only for producers w ho w ished  to pu t th eir grain  im m e ­
diately into the F O R .
A u g . 2 ,1 9 7 8 — U S D  A  w ithdraw s release authorization from  
barley in  grain  reserve.
A u g . 7 , 1978— A n n o u n c em e n t th a t 1 9 7 8  corp corn and  
sorghum  placed under price support loan  w ill be perm itted  
to go directly into the F O R  i f  it  seem s th at th e reserve goals  
w ill not be m et from  1977  crops by O ctober 1.
A u g . 7 , 1978— R eserve transportation assistance to pro­
ducers u n able to place 1977  crop c o m  in  th e  grain  reserve  
because o f local storage not b ein g  available.
Sept. 1 5 ,1 9 7 8 — A uth orized  early  delivery on 1977  crop c o m  
loans for farm ers w ho find it im possible to use the reserve  
and who have storage problem s for th e upcom ing 1978  crop.
Sept. 2 0 ,1 9 7 8 — 1978  rice crop eligib le  for F O R .
O ct. 5 ,1 9 7 8 — A nn ou n ced  th at 1978  crop corn eligib le  for 
im m ediate en try into grain  reserve.
Nov. 2 4 ,1 9 7 8 — 1978  crop corn w ill not be accepted for im ­
m e d ia te  e n tr y  in to  th e  F a r m e r -O w n e d  R e serv e  a fte r  
N ovem ber 3 0  because th e feed grain  reserve ta rg et w ill 
have been reached.
M arch  12, 1979— O ats in  th e F O R  were released  for sale , 
effective im m ediately.
M arch  2 1 ,1 9 7 9 — W h ea t producers given  option o f extend­
in g C C C  loans for 6  m onths.
M arch  3 0 ,1 9 7 9 — T h e Friday afternoon w eek ly  report o f  a 
telephone survey show ing feed grain , rice, and w heat in the  
farm er-held  reserve to be discontinued.
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M ay 2 ,1 9 7 9 — U S D A  w ithdrew  its authorization releasing  
oats from  th e Farm er-O w ned R eserve.
M ay  11, 1979— O ats in  the F O R  were released for sale , 
effective im m ediately.
M ay  16, 1979— W h ea t in  the F O R  was released for sale , 
effective im m ediately.
June 5 ,1 9 7 9 — F O R  barley released a second tim e.
June 1 8 ,1 9 7 9 — Farm ers given option to extend barley C C C  
loans for 6  m onths.
June 19, 1979— C o m  in  th e F O R  was released for sale , 
effective im m ediately.
June 2 2 ,1 9 7 9 — Sorghum  in the F O R  was released for sale , 
effective im m ediately.
June 2 6 ,1 9 7 9 — O ats and barley called from  F O R .
June 2 7 ,1 9 7 9 — Farm ers given option to extend oats non­
recourse loans for 6  m onths.
J u ly  2 ,1 9 7 9 — W h ea t to stay in release status. W h ea t stor­
age stopped in  a ll states, effective June 3 0 .
J u ly  2 7 ,1 9 7 9 — Farm ers given option to extend settlem en t  
on barley and oats in reserve for 30-d a y  intervals.
A u g . 1, 1 9 7 9 — F a r m e rs  g iv e n  o p tio n  to  e x te n d  co rn , 
sorghum , and soybean nonrecourse loans for 6  m onths.
A u g . 1 ,1 9 7 9 — R eserve release continued for w heat, w ith ­
drawn for corn and sorghum .
A u g . 3 , 1979— R eserve grain  called bu t not redeem ed is 
eligible to re-en ter the reserve i f  national average price  
falls below  the release level. O ats not redeem ed from  re­
serve given the option o f re-en terin g the reserve.
Sept. 6 ,1 9 7 9 — Farm er-O w ned Sorghum  R eserve released  
for second tim e.
Sept. 2 0 , 1979— F arm er-O w ned O ats R eserve released for 
third  tim e.
Oct. 1 ,1 9 7 9 — F arm er-O w ned Rice Reserve released for first 
tim e.
O ct. 3 , 1979— Farm er-O w ned C orn R eserve released for 
second tim e.
Oct. 2 2 , 1979— A ll  1979  loan  grain  and outstandin g 1978  
loans eligible for im m ediate entry into reserve.
O ct. 3 1 ,1 9 7 9 — Sorghum  w ithdraw n from  release status.
Nov. 3 0 ,1 9 7 9 — C orn w ithdraw n from  release status.
Jan. 1 0 ,1 9 8 0  (effective 1 /7 /80 )— A ction s taken  to help pro­
tect producers from  an y adverse effects o f suspending ex­
ports to th e  S ov iet U n io n  in clu ded  in creasin g  storage  
p aym en t rates to 2 6 .5  cents per bu shel, or 2 0  cents per 
bu shel for oats; increasing reserve loan  rates for 1979 crop 
food and feed grain s; increasing release and call levels to 
145 percent o f the loan  rate for feed grain s and 185 percent 
for w heat; w aivin g a ll in terest on reserve loans for up to 512 
m illion  bu shels o f  co m ; and direct acquisition o f grain by 
C C C . Farm ers w ould  have 9 0  days for settlem en t after 
grain  is called.
Jan. 1 8 ,1 9 8 0 — F O R  w heat under new  agreem ent (Reserve 
II) released.
Jan. 2 3 ,1 9 8 0 — Corn placed in the reserve betw een October 
22  and January 7 w ill be eligible for interest waiver after 
January 7.
Feb. 1, 1980— O ats w ithdraw n from  release status.
Feb. 7 , 198 0 — F arm er-ow n ed  O ats R eserve released for 
fourth tim e.
M arch  3 ,1 9 8 0 — R ice called from  reserve. N ew  agreem ent 
w heat (R eserve II) w ithdraw n from  release.
M arch  2 8 ,1 9 8 0 — C o m  producers to receive transportation  
aid in  storage problem  areas.
A p ril 1, 1980— O ats w ithdraw n from  release status.
A p ril 1 1 ,1 9 8 0 — T h e reserve was opened to previously inel­
igible c o m  producers under R L . 9 6 -2 3 4 . T his allowed pro­
ducers not in  com pliance w ith  farm  program s that year to 
participate in  the 1 9 7 9 /8 0  p rogram , bu t the first year inter­
est was not w aived for co m .
A p ril 1 5 ,1 9 8 0 — F arm er-O w ned O ats R eserve released for 
fifth  tim e.
M a y  2 , 1 9 8 0 — A u th o rization  to rem ove old agreem ent 
w heat from  grain  reserve w ithdraw n.
M ay  8 , 1980— O ld  agreem en t w heat in reserve released  
(Reserve I).
M ay  1 3 ,1 9 8 0 — Corn nonparticipants given 30  m ore days to 
put corn in reserve.
M ay  2 2 ,1 9 8 0 — U S D A  announced new barley grain  reserve 
program , p erm ittin g  im m ed iate  en try o f new  crop into 
reserve.
M ay  2 3 ,1 9 8 0 — O ats called  from  grain  reserve.
J u ly  2 , 1980— F arm er-O w ned Sorghum  Reserve released  
for third tim e.
J u ly  8 , 1 9 8 0 — B a rle y  in  n ew  F a rm e r-O w n e d  R eserve  
released.
J u ly  8 , 1980— N ew  agreem en t w heat in  reserve released  
(Reserve II).
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J u ly 1 1 ,1 9 8 0 — C o m  in  F O R  released for third  tim e.
J u ly  1 5 ,1 9 8 0 — N ew  agreem en t oats (Reserve II) called from  
grain reserve.
Ju ly 1 7 ,1 9 8 0 — O ld  agreem en t sorghum  (Reserve I) called  
from  reserve.
Ju ly 2 5 ,1 9 8 0 — N ew  agreem en t sorghum  (Reserve II) called  
from  reserve.
J u ly  2 8 ,1 9 8 0 — Loan rates increased for w heat, feed grains, 
and soybeans. R eserve release and call levels rem ain  at 125  
percent and 145 percent for feed grain s, are revised to 140  
percent and 175 percent for w heat.
A u g . 8 ,1 9 8 0 — H ig h er grain  reserve release and call levels 
put into effect (Reserve III).
A u g . 2 5 ,1 9 8 0 — N o furth er entries perm itted  into Reserve  
II.
A u g . 2 9 ,1 9 8 0 — C orn and sorghum  in R eserve III released.
Sept. 5 ,1 9 8 0 — W h ea t R eserve I and II and B arley R eserve  
II w ithdraw n from  release.
Sept. 8 , 1980— R eserve I call period extended to 9 0  days. 
Conversion to R eserve III m u st be done before a reserve is 
called.
Sept. 1 0 ,1 9 8 0 — O ats in  R eserve III released.
Sept. 17, 1980— O ats in  R eserve III called.
Oct. 2 2 ,1 9 8 0 — W h ea t in  R eserves I and III released.
Oct. 2 2 ,1 9 8 0 — B arley in  R eserves I and III released.
Oct. 2 3 ,1 9 8 0 — G rain  in  R eserve I changed to 5 consecutive  
days at or above the call level.
Oct. 31, 1980— C orn in  R eserve I called.
Nov. 6 ,1 9 8 0 — Sorghum  in R eserve III called.
Dec. 3 ,1 9 8 0 — T h e provisions o f  the A gricu ltu ral A c t o f 1980  
(R L. 9 6 -4 9 4 ) established special (higher) loan rates for the  
reserve participants, waived interest on a ll F O R  loans for 
1980 and 1981 crops, gave the secretary o f agriculture dis­
cretion to set release and call prices independently o f loan  
rates, changed the m inim u m  C C C  sale price o f grain  from  
150 percent o f the loan  rate to 105 percent o f the call price, 
and required the President to estab lish  a w heat reserve of  
up to 4  m illion  tons for em ergency h u m an itarian  food needs 
in developing countries.
Dec. 8 ,1 9 8 0 — R eserve call w ill not be announced u n til both  
daily adjusted and the 5-day m ovin g average are both at or 
above the call level for 5 consecutive days.
Dec. 8 ,1 9 8 0 — Secretary deferred callin g corn in reserve per 
new regulations.
Dec. 3 0 ,1 9 8 0 — Corn in  R eserves II and III called. Producers 
m ay continue to place eligible corn into Reserve III through  
January 15, 1981.
Jan, 6 ,1 9 8 1 — W h e a t w ithdraw n from  release  status.
Feb. 6 ,1 9 8 1 — A u th orized  30 -d a y  extension  on reserve and  
regu lar loan  m atu rity  days. In terest o f  1 5 .2 5  percent w ill be  
charged after m atu rity  date.
(a) I C o m  extended to M arch  11, 1981.
(b) II and III C o m  extended to M a y  1 5 ,1 9 8 1 .
(c) III S orgh u m  extended to M arch  1 4 ,1 9 8 1 .
A p ril 1 6 ,1 9 8 1 — S ettlem en t date w as cancelled  for reserve  
c o m . F arm ers no longer have to settle  by M a y  15, b u t  
interest w ill be charged at 15 .2 5  percent a fter A p ril 15.
A p ril 2 8 ,1 9 8 1 — E ffective M a y  1, w heat and barley release  
and call levels increased to reflect h igh er 1981 loan  rate.
M ay  7 ,1 9 8 1 — B arley w ithdraw n from  release status (had  
been in release status since O ctober 2 2 , 1980).
J u ly  2 3 ,1 9 8 1 — P resident sign s P.L. 9 7 -0 2 4 , w hich  repealed  
the in terest w aiver m andated  b y  the A gricu ltu re  A c t  o f  
1980 . D irect en try was offered for 1981 crop w heat. T rigger  
at $ 4 .6 5  per b u sh el, at w hich  tim e storage w ill stop and  
interest w ill start. A  m in im u m  cap o f 7 0 0  m illion  b u sh els is  
established.
D ec. 2 2 ,1 9 8 1 — T h e F arm er-O w n ed R eserve provided for by  
the Food and A gricu ltu ra l A c t o f 1977  h as been  continued  
under the A gricu ltu re and Food A c t o f 1981 (P.L. 9 7 -9 8 ), 
w ith  m odifications:
Extended C C C  loans for 3 -5  years are still th e  basis for 
the reserve, b u t th e secretary o f agriculture m ay estab lish  a  
h igh er special loan  rate for reserve grain  (as in  th e 1980  
act).
Mandated commodity coverage applies to feed grain s  
and w heat.
Cross-compliance w ith  set-a sid e  or acreage red u ction  
program s (but not diversion program s) is still required as a  
condition for com m odity loans o f th e F O R .
Size limits m ay be estab lish ed  by th e secretary b u t th ese  
lim its m u st be at least as h ig h  as 7 0 0  m illion  bu sh els for 
w heat and 1 b illion  bu sh els for feed grain s.
Storage subsidies (paym ents and in terest w aivers or ad­
ju stm en ts) can be varied, at the discretion o f th e secretary  
of agriculture, to encourage e ith er participation or repay­
m en t o f  reserve loans.
Release and call provisions under 1981 act continue to  
include use o f a  release price tr igg er to determ ine w h en  
producers m ay (w ithout penalty) w ithdraw  grain  from  the  
reserve before th e m atu rity  o f  th e reserve loan , b u t call 
prices are elim in ated  in  new  contracts. D ecisions to call 
reserve grain  in  em ergen cy situ ations are to be m ade b y  the  
secretary o f agriculture. T h e secretary o f agriculture h as  
com plete discretion to estab lish  th e level o f  th e  release  
price independently o f  the loan  rate (as in  th e  1980  act).
Limits on sale of CCC grain are based on a  minimum sale  
price equ al to 110 percent o f  th e reserve price.
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Jan. 2 9 ,1 9 8 2 — A n n ou n ced  th at 1 982 w heat and feed grains  
placed under C C C  loan  w ould be eligib le  for im m ediate  
entry into the F O R .
M ay  1 4 ,1 9 8 2 — W h ea t and barley perm itted  im m ediate en­
try  into R eserve V.
J u ly  f§ 1982— C orn and sorghum  perm itted  im m ediate en­
try  into R eserve V.
J u ly  2 8 ,1 9 8 2 — R otation period extended from  3 0  to 6 0  days 
for corn and sorghum .
A u g . 2 , 1982— 1981 and 1982 oats e ligible  for im m ediate  
entry into F O R .
Oct. 7 ,1 9 8 2 — Effective O ctober 8 ,1 9 8 2 ,  producers placing  
farm -stored corn or sorghum  into th e  reserve sh all be per­
m itted  to rem ove the grain  if:
(a) The com m odity is in  danger o f  goin g out of condition, (b) 
T h e rem oved reserve grain  is replaced w ith in  15 days.
M arch  2 ,1 9 8 3 — M arch  3 1 ,1 9 8 3 , is th e reserve en try dead­
line for w heat, barley, and oats.
M arch  2 8 , 1983— N otice th at P IK  grain  m a y be rotated  
through n orm al rotation provisions.
M ay  1 0 ,1 9 8 3 — N otice th at fin al settlem en t date for u n set­
tled  called reserve loans is M ay  3 1 ,1 9 8 3 , except for loans  
designated for P IK  or accepted for A cqu isition  Program .
J u ly  1 5 ,1 9 8 3 — C o m  R eserve IV  triggered for release.
J u ly  2 6 ,1 9 8 3 — C o m  R eserve V  triggered  for release.
A u g . 3 ,1 9 8 3 — Sorghum  R eserve IV  triggered for release.
A u g . 1 1 ,1 9 8 3 — O ats R eserve V  triggered for release.
Sept. 2 ,1 9 8 3 — Corn in  R eserves IV  and V  rem ained  trig ­
gered. Storage stopped as o f A u g u st 31; in terest started  as 
of Septem ber 1.
Oct. 4 ,1 9 8 3 — Corn IV  and V, Sorghum  IV, and O ats V  all 
still in  release.
Nov. 1 ,1 9 8 3 — S orgh u m  IV, O ats V  and C orn  V  taken  out of 
release. O n ly  C orn R eserve IV  rem ain s in  release status.
Nov. 2 , 1983— R eserve V  C o m  back in release. W ill be in 
release "s ta tu s” for N ovem ber and D ecem ber, and reserve 
holders to earn  storage during th is period.
D ec. 5 ,1 9 8 3 — C orn R eserve IV  rem ain s in  release.
D ec. 7 ,1 9 8 3 — O ats in  R eserve V  triggered. W ill rem ain in 
re le a se  u n til  J a n u a r y  3 1 , 1 9 8 4  an d  w ill  e a rn  storage  
th rough January 31.
Jan. 4 ,1 9 8 4 — C o m  in  R eserve V  rem ain s open, im plying  
sto ra g e  p a y m e n ts  w ill  n ot be e a rn ed  for corn  during  
January.
Jan . 19 , 1 9 8 4 — R e serv e  V I  e s ta b lis h e d  for 1 9 8 3  crop 
w heat— m in im u m  trigger o f $ 4 .4 5  per bu shel. Reserve V  
reopened for 1 983 . Feed grain  crops or a ll other grain eligi­
ble for reserve.
Feb. 2 ,1 9 8 4 — C orn R eserve IV  and V  rem oved from  release 
and w ill earn  storage for m on th s o f February and March. 
O ats continue in  a  release status and storage stops as of 
February 1.
M arch  2 , 1984— C orn  R eserve IV  triggered  for release. 
O ats, triggered  on D ecem ber 7 ,1 9 8 3 ,  rem ain  in release.
M arch  7 ,1 9 8 4 — C o m  R eserve V  triggered for release.
A p ril 3 ,1 9 8 4 — O ats rem ain  in  release, storage payments 
continue to be stopped, and in terest w ill continue to accrue.
A u g . 2 ,1 9 8 4 — C orn R eserve IV  and V  rem oved from  release 
status. O ats rem ain  in  release.
A u g . 8 , 1984— C orn R eserve IV  triggered. Storage pay­
m en ts w ill continue to be m ade through Septem ber 30.
O ct. 2 ,1 9 8 4 — C orn R eserve IV  rem oved from  release. Oats 
rem ain  in  release.
Nov. 2 ,1 9 8 4 — O ats R eserve V  rem oved from  release. Stor­
age p aym en t w ill resum e.
Nov. 7 ,1 9 8 4 — O ats R eserve V  back in  release. W ill remain  
for N ovem ber and D ecem ber and w ill earn storage pay­
m en ts d u rin g th is period.
